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INTRODUCTION
Any lawyer knows that in order to win a trial, whether civil or crimi-
nal, one has to tell a story that the jury understands.' The narrative can be
* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Illinois Program in Business Law and Policy,
University of Illinois College of Law. The author would like to thank participants at the
Michigan State University College of Law conference on business law and narrative and
Jayne Barnard for her live blogging of the Madoff allocution for Conglomerate blog: The
Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org (last visited May 12, 2010).
1. Narrative is also important in the lawmaking realm, with those arguing for or
against regulation arming themselves with narratives, a fancier word for anecdotes. See
generally David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 804-07
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as important as the facts or the law and will weave both facts and law to-
gether into a familiar story that resonates with the particular audience. In
white-collar crime, some narratives are hard to devise because the facts are
complicated.2 Prosecutors prefer simple frauds over complex ones, and may
often choose which behavior to prosecute based on how well the jury will
understand the narrative they will be able to construct.' Unfortunately for
Bernard Madoff, the crime with which he was charged was simple and fa-
miliar, a centuries-old scam any juror would recognize.' In addition, Ma-
(1998) (giving many examples of legislative efforts that were fueled by "unrepresentative"
and "questionable" narratives, including welfare reform, tort reform, and environmental
protection). Professor Hyman's article also contains a helpful listing of many important
scholarly works on the intersection of law and narrative. Id. at 798 nn.4-7.
2. One strategy is to try to boil down a complicated financial fraud to one false
statement, as the prosecution tried unsuccessfully to do in the trial of two Bear Steams hedge
fund managers. See Zachery Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquit-
ted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at Al (reporting that the defense attorney warned the jury
that the prosecution was taking email comments out of context as "'misleading sound bi-
tes'); Thom Weidlich & Carlyn Kolker, Bear Stearns Loss Echoes Long Line of U.S. Prose-
cution Defeats, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20670001&sid=apkJQ71ZFjJs (noting that the common prosecutor strategy of isolating
a few emails to depict a complex fraud story had backfired in both the Bear Steams trial and
the Frank Quattrone trials). See also Lawrence Delevingne, What the Bear Stearns Acquittal
Means for Wall Street, Bus. INSIDER, Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/ what-
the-bear-steams-acquittal-means-for-wall-street-2009-11 (reporting that "[s]ources close to
the prosecution" believed that "the Brooklyn jury wasn't sophisticated enough to under-
stand" the complex fraud, but quoting a prominent attorney as saying "I don't know a losing
trial lawyer who thinks the jury got it").
3. See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporation Law, 33 J. CORP. L.
361, 395 (2008) (explaining that given the complexity of the financial transactions at the
heart of the investigation of Enron Corp., prosecutors chose "the simplest cases to bring
criminal charges against Enron and [its officers]").
4. See Noel Sheppard, The Social Security Ponzi Scheme, AM. THINKER, Mar. 16,
2005, http://www.americanthinker.com/printpage/?url=http://www.americanthinker.
com/2005/03/the socialsecurityponzi sche.html ("'Ponzi schemes are a type of illegal
pyramid scheme named for Charles Ponzi .... Decades later, the Ponzi scheme continues to
work on the "rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul" principle, as money from new investors is used to pay
off earlier investors until the whole scheme collapses."' (citation omitted)); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1278 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "Ponzi scheme" as "[a] fraudulent investment
scheme in which money contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends or
returns for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger investments. Money
from the new investors is used directly to repay or pay interest to earlier investors, usu. with-
out any operation or revenue-producing activity other than the continual raising of new
funds."). Note that although Ponzi schemes are necessarily pyramid schemes, many "pyra-
mid schemes," where salespeople recruit other salespeople and receive a percentage of the
sales of those they recruit, are legitimate multi-level marketing businesses that sell actual
products or services. See generally Sergio Pareja, Sales Gone Wild: Will the FTC's Business
Opportunity Rule Put an End to Pyramid Marketing Schemes?, 39 McGEORGE L. REv. 83
(2008) (discussing differences in illegal and legal multi-level marketing businesses). How-
ever, some fraudulent pyramid schemes exist solely to collect initial investment money from
new recruits without actually selling a product or service. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
948 [Vol. 2009:947
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doff had no compelling counter-narrative5 to mitigate the unsympathetic
depiction of himself as an unfeeling scoundrel who stole from his closest
friends and relatives. Perhaps for these and other reasons, Madoff chose to
forego a trial and plead guilty.'
However, the audience was not finished judging Madoff. Although he
escaped a trial, he was judged quite harshly in the court of public opinion.
Madoff's financial crimes, which resulted in many individuals, businesses,
and charitable foundations losing great amounts of money, became a sym-
bol for the greediness and immorality of a financial meltdown he did not
cause. Numerous newspaper and magazine articles' and even books' were
quickly written about Madoff, and the audience's hatred for him was clear.
Madoff was eventually sentenced to 150 years in prison,' an amazingly long
prison term for a seventy-one-year-old man who had pled guilty quickly and
saved the government the burden of a trial."o In his sentencing remarks,
Judge Denny Chin rejected the notion that Madoff's fraudulent investment
scheme was a "bloodless . . . crime" and instead described it as an "extraor-
dinary evil.""
1357 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "pyramid scheme" as "[a] property-distribution scheme in
which a participant pays for the chance to receive compensation for introducing new persons
to the scheme, as well as for when those new persons themselves introduce participants").
5. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 46-49, United States v. Madoff, 626 F.
Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009) (No. 09 Cr. 213), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090629sentencingtranscriptcorrected.pdf [herei-
nafter Sentencing Transcript] ("In terms of mitigating factors in a white-collar fraud case
such as this, I would expect to see letters from family and friends and colleagues. But not a
single letter has been submitted attesting to Mr. Madoff's good deeds or good character or
civic or charitable activities. The absence of such support is telling.").
6. See Transcript of Plea Hearing at 25, United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d
420 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009) (No. 09 Cr. 213), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/madoffhearing031209.pdf [hereinafter Plea Tran-
script].
7. The most in-depth magazine coverage came from Vanity Fair, under the catego-
ry of "The Madoff Chronicles," which ran from January 2009 to September 2009. See, e.g.,
Mark Seal, Madof's World, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2009, at 124 ("Amid the sobs, screams, and
curses in Aspen, Palm Beach, and New York, with victims sharing their stories, [the author]
gets behind Madoff's affable fagade, to reveal his most intimate betrayals.").
8. See, e.g., HARRY MARKOPOLOs, No ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL
THRILLER (2010); ERIN ARVEDLUND, Too GOOD TO BE TRUE: THE RISE AND FALL OF BERNIE
MADOFF (2009); ANDREw KIRTZMAN, BETRAYAL: THE LIFE AND LIES OF BERNIE MADOFF
(2009); SHERYL WEINSTEIN, MADOFF'S OTHER SECRET: LOVE, MONEY, BERNIE, AND ME
(2009).
9. See Janet Morrissey, The Penalty for "Extraordinary Evil": Madoff Gets 150
Years, TIME, June 29, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1907677,00.
html.
10. But see id. (noting that the previous year, a 72-year-old fraudster was sentenced
to 330 years).
11. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 47-49.
Winter] 949
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Though Madoff himself has been largely silent, his victims have
created their own Bernie Madoff narrative out of their stories. These stories
have been told online,12 in the press, 3 in victim impact statements, and in
congressional testimony. 14 These narratives have worked within legal struc-
tures to shape Madoff's sentence," to rewrite laws to reform the victims'
financial compensation,'" and possibly to increase regulation of hedge
funds," though Madoff was only pretending to be a hedge fund."
This Article will examine the Madoff scandal and attempt to place it
within the realm of modem financial frauds and the sensationalism sur-
rounding them. Particularly, this Article will hypothesize that in the rela-
tively safe and healthy environment of twenty-first-century United States,
perceived threats to financial welfare are more salient to most Americans
12. Several websites are dedicated to the support of and airing of grievances by
Madoff victims. See, e.g., Bernard Madoff Victims Coalition, Bernard Madoff Fraud Vic-
tims Support Group Website, http://bernardmadoffvictims.org/ (last visited May 12, 2010);
Madoff Help, News & Assistance Website & Blog, http://www.madoff-help.com/ (last vi-
sited May 12, 2010); Newsvine, http://madoffvictim.newsvine.com/ (last visited May 12,
2010).
13. See, e.g., Robert Chew, How I Got Screwed by Bernie Madoff TIME, Dec. 15,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1866398,00.html ("We
didn't know it yet, but we had been playing in the Bernard Madoff Investment Securities
LLC Fantasy Financial League.").
14. On December 9, 2008, Madoff victims were invited to speak before a subcom-
mittee of the House of Representatives Financial Services Committee. See, e.g., Additional
Reforms to the Securities Investor Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial
Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Helen Davis Chaitman, Madoff Investor and Legal
Advisor to the Madoff Coalition for Investor Protection), available at 2009 WL 4647556
[hereinafter Chaitman Testimony].
15. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 42 ("1 take into account what I have
read in the presentence report, the parties' sentencing submissions, and the e-mails and let-
ters from victims. I take into account what I have heard [from testifying victims] today.").
16. See John D. McKinnon & Jane J. Kim, Ponzi Scheme Victims Get a Tax Break,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at A4 (reporting that the Internal Revenue Service issued two
new regulations giving the Madoff victims and other Ponzi scheme victims "unprecedented
tax relief' in response to pressure from the victims). In addition, legislation has been intro-
duced to change victim compensation awarded by the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion. See, e.g., H.R. 2798, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (proposing to increase SIPC cover-
age of investors who are the victims of fraud).
17. See Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 711, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009) (abolishing the registration exemption for hedge fund managers with fifteen or
fewer clients).
18. Madoff never referred to his advisory fund as a hedge fund, but others did. See
ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 151 ("Madoff never called his off-the-books side business a
hedge fund. He never even gave it a name. He swore investors to secrecy, making them
promise not to tell anyone he was managing their money."). Note that Madoff operated for
years without registering as an investment advisor, without relying on the fifteen-or-fewer
exemption because he had many more than fifteen clients. Id.
950 [Vol. 2009:947
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than perceived threats to our physical welfare.'9 Because of this reversal,
the harsh sentencing of financial fraudsters compared to that of violent
criminals reflects the values of a modem society. To those whose greatest
fear is to outlive their retirement funds, Madoff's fraudulent investment
scheme is an "extraordinary evil." Therefore, the Madoff victim narrative
resonates with judges, lawmakers, and the public at large.
I. MADOFF'S EXTRAORDINARY CRIME
A. The Rise and Fall of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
Bernard L. Madoff founded his firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities (BLMIS), in 1960.20 Madoff was young and barely out of col-
lege21 when he founded his operation with money borrowed from his father-
in-law.22 Though the firm was known for decades as a trading and market-
making firm, Madoff had been running a secret investment advisory busi-
ness since the inception of BLMIS.23 Because Madoff was not a registered
investment advisor until 2006,24 this business was always illegal,25 but was
well known as a hedge fund by the late 1990s, although it probably never
operated as an investment fund at all. This fund operated two floors below
Madoff's legitimate operations, staffed leanly by its chief financial officer,
Frank DiPascali, who held only a high school degree,2 6 and Annette Bon-
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Seal, supra note 7, at 124.
21. After graduating from Hofstra University, Madoff went to Brooklyn Law School
for one year before dropping out. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 20. However, he fos-
tered the idea among his clientele that he was an attorney. See id. (noting that his website
used the language that he started BLMIS "'in 1960 soon after leaving law school"').
22. See KIRTZMAN, supra note 8, at 37 (noting that he started his fund at the age of
twenty-two, after passing the General Securities Representative exam and the General Secur-
ities Principal exam).
23. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 30.
24. Madoff confessed in his plea allocution that he had lied on his 2006 investment
adviser registration. See Plea Transcript, supra note 6, at 28 ("On this form I intentionally
and falsely certified under penalty of perjury that Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
had custody of my advisory clients' securities. That was not true, and I knew it .... ).
25. See id. at 54 ("Madoff wasn't registered as an investment adviser, so his advi-
sory business was always illegal." And it may have always been an outright fraud.).
26. Frank DiPascali began working for Madoff in 1975 after graduating from high
school, working his way up to supervising the 17th floor by 1987. Plea Hearing Transcript at
44-45, United States v. DiPascali, No. 09 Cr. 764 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/dipascaliplea8ll09.pdf [hereinafter DiPascali Plea
Transcript]. DiPascali believes that the fraud began in the late 1980s or early 1990s. See id.
at 46 ("I represented to hundreds, if not thousands, of clients that security trades were being
placed in their accounts when in fact no trades were taking place at all.").
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giomo, who supervised a team of young workers with no finance training.27
According to investigators, though monthly statements to investors showed
profitable investment activity, no trades had been effected by the fund in its
last thirteen years of operation." In addition to the U.S. operations, Madoff
also owned Madoff Securities International Limited, based in London,29
which went bankrupt at the same time as BLMIS.
By December 2008, the advisory business part of BLMIS serviced al-
most 5,000 client accounts and showed client funds of almost $65 billion on
its financial statements.30 However, the money did not exist, and in fact
BLMIS accounts held only a tiny fraction of that amount, only funds that
had recently been received and not moved to other accounts controlled by
Madoff. 1 Total client losses have been estimated at between $13.2 billion32
and $65 billion, depending on the method of calculation.33 Regulators have
estimated that over the life of the fund, Madoff probably received no more
than $20 billion in client funds; because that money was never invested, the
phantom billions never existed.34
27. See Mark Seal & Eleanor Squillari, "Hello Madoffi" The Madoff Chronicles,
Part II: What the Secretary Saw, VANITY FAIR, June 2009, at 160-61 (describing the atmos-
phere of the 17th floor, which was kept separate from the trading operations of the 19th
floor).
28. Tom Hays, Madoff Ponzi Scheme: No Indication Stocks Were Ever Purchased,
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/20/
madoff-ponzi-scheme-stock_n_168568.html.
29. See KIRTZMAN, supra note 8, at 176.
30. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 3, United States v. Madoff, 626 F.
Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (No. 09 Cr. 213) [hereinafter Sentencing Memoran-
dum].
31. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 192 (reporting that between September 2008
and December 11, 2008, Madoff's sole business bank account, at JP Morgan Chase, came
close to zero several times, after averaging a balance of several billions in past years).
32. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 7.
33. The calculation of investor losses, particularly those losses that are covered by
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation insurance, is the subject of ongoing litigation.
Generally, there is a dispute as to whether "losses" are the difference between what clients
invested and what they withdrew over time or the amount that clients believed they had
invested according to their monthly statements. In addition, other issues such as taxes paid
on phantom gains and mandatory withdrawals pursuant to IRA accounts further complicate
how to calculate individual losses. See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Vic-
tims' Motion for Reconsideration, United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 2009) (No. 09 Cr. 213) (disagreeing with SIPC trustee Irving Picard's calculation of
valid customer claims).
34. Some have estimated that the most that Madoff ever received from investors was
$20 billion, making a frantic search for the missing $65 billion illusory. See James Bandler,
Nicholas Varchaver & Doris Burke, How Bernie Did It, FORTUNE, May 11, 2009, at 51, 70-
71 (noting that investigators are not going to have a "miraculous discovery of a giant vault
with $65 billion in cash" because the actual amount received, and spent, over the years was
approximately $20 billion).
952 [Vol. 2009:947
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Meanwhile, the trading arm of BLMIS was highly successful35 and
brought to Madoff a sterling business reputation, which surely helped re-
cruit advisory clients. In addition, Madoff's efforts in the 1970s and 1980s
to establish competitive regional exchanges and to increase the influence of
the NASDAQ"6 brought him the respect and trust of the SEC, which had a
similar agenda to break the trading monopolies of the NYSE and the
AMEX. 37 However, Madoff's strategy for trading success-luring trades
off of the NYSE and creating a "third market"--established him forever as
a type of maverick outsider, a reputation that may have also helped him gain
investors who did not trust traditional Wall Street financial types.3 1
Exactly when Madoff changed course from operating a legitimate, but
illegal, investment fund for his clients to operating one of the largest Ponzi
schemes in history is unclear." Madoff maintains that he was investing
35. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 37 (noting that by 1986, "Financial World
listed Madoff as one of the top one hundred best paid on Wall Street").
36. Madoff often referred to himself as a founder or a designer of the NASDAQ,
which was untrue. See Bandler et al., supra note 34, at 59, 62 (quoting Charles "Dick" Jus-
tice, former chief technology officer of the National Association of Securities Dealers as
saying that Madoff was neither a founder nor a designer of the NASDAQ). However, he did
use the electronic trading platform to his advantage and headed the NASDAQ design com-
mittee from 1981 to 1983. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 33-34.
37. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 39.
38. Madoff's firm was one of the first to lure trades off of the NYSE by offering
brokers a one-cent rebate. During this time, market makers made money on each trade by
"the spread" between the buyers and the sellers, in increments of one-eighth of a dollar, or 12
V2 cents. By increasing traffic, the one-cent rebate was a small price to pay for trades. How-
ever, this practice did not make Madoff any fans at the NYSE, including Richard Grosso.
The paying for trade flow practice eventually came under scrutiny by the SEC, but the prac-
tice was never prohibited. Compare Richard L. Stem, Living Off the Spread, FORBES, July
10, 1989, at 66 (presenting Madoff's rebates as good for both brokers and customers), with
Gary Slutsker, If You Can't Beat 'Em, FORBES, Jan. 6, 1992, at 48 ("Intelligent people can
disagree as to whether . .. [Madoff's rebate] is good or bad for investors."), and Neil Wein-
berg & Daniel Kruger, Death by a Thousand Trades, FORBES, Dec. 11, 2000, at 262, 264
("Payment for order flow is, alas, but one of several ways Wall Street profits from the un-
wary."). In fact, Madoff gained more friends at the SEC during the investigation. See Band-
ler et al., supra note 34, at 62 (quoting a former SEC chairman and head of the investigating
panel as saying "we got pretty chummy").
39. During Madoff s allocution, he was vague about when the fraudulent operations
began. The closest that Madoff came to naming a date was when he stated that "[t]o the best
of my recollection [the scheme] began in the early 1990s" due to the recessionary investment
climate. See Plea Transcript, supra note 6, at 25 ("While I never promised a specific rate of
return to my client, I felt compelled to satisfy my clients' expectations, at any cost."). How-
ever, the prosecution stated at the same hearing that the government would have proved at
trial that Madoff had operated a Ponzi scheme since "at least as early as the 1980s." Id. at
31-32.
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client funds until sometime in the 1990s, when the market was struggling.40
Others guess that the fund was never legitimate and that returns were
funded by the once extremely lucrative market-making business. However,
as market-making profits were thinned due to the decimalization of stock
prices, eliminating large spreads between the bid and ask prices,4 1 these
profits may not have been enough to cover returns, requiring Madoff to re-
pay early investors with new investors' money. In the 1990s, Madoff defi-
nitely made a push for more and more investors through recruiters, main-
taining the sense of exclusivity necessary to lure in investors.42 Regardless
of whether the fund was ever truly an investment fund, Madoff admits that
for the past many years, it was nothing other than a Ponzi scheme,43 even
though the fund had survived several close calls with regulators" and cu-
rious competitors.45 One remaining question is whether the illegitimate in-
40. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8 (noting that some argued that the fund turned
fraudulent during the crash of 1987, but that at least by 1993, Madoff was actively recruiting
investors to his fund).
41. Madoff's market-making goose was hit hard when the spread between bid and
ask prices for stocks in the United States was cut first to one-sixteenth of a dollar, or six and
one-quarter cents, in 1997, and then to one cent in 2001. See Bandler et al., supra note 34, at
64 (reporting that "Madoffs market-making operation would never again be the prodigious
cash generator it had been"). Market-making profits at BLMIS fell half a billion dollars
between 2000 and 2005, leading both Charles Schwab and Goldman Sachs to offer to buy the
market-making arm of BLMIS. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 170-72 (noting that during
this time, the 17th floor operations probably began to subsidize the 19th floor operations).
42. Madoff used a network of recruiters and feeder funds to bring in clients, includ-
ing Robert Jaffe in Palm Beach, Mike Engler in Minnesota, Walter Noel in Connecticut, Ezra
Merkin in Manhattan, Sonja Kohn in Austria, and Thierry de la Villehuchet in France. See
Seal & Squillari, supra note 27, at 162.
43. See Plea Transcript, supra note 6, at 23 ("Your Honor, for many years up until
my arrest on December 11, 2008, I operated a Ponzi scheme through the investment advisory
side of my business, Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC . . . .").
44. Madoff came very close to being discovered at least three times. In 1992, a
skeptical client of Madoffs first "feeders," Frank Avellino and Michael Bienes, tipped off
the SEC to the two recruiters, who guaranteed investors returns of twenty percent. Madoff
stepped in and named himself their broker and "returned" all the client monies, approximate-
ly $440 million, claiming he thought they were registered investment advisors. See
KIRTZMAN, supra note 8, at 64. Satisfied Avellino and Bienes customers then became direct
Madoff clients, and the SEC thought that Madoff was the good guy. Id. at 64-65. Again, in
2005, after an SEC investigation, which involved one SEC attorney who later married Ma-
doff s niece Shana, the SEC cited Madoff for three minor violations. See ARVEDLUND, supra
note 8; KIRTZMAN, supra note 8. In November 2007, thirteen months before Madoff would
confess to one of the largest frauds in U.S. history, the SEC closed another investigation of
BLMIS by saying that the staff had found no evidence of fraud. See ARVEDLUND, supra note
8; KIRTZMAN, supra note 8.
45. Harry Markopolos, a "rocket scientist" who offered investment clients complex
trading programs, is now widely credited with being the first person to see through Madoff's
mystique. However, because of his eccentric personality, personal bias against his competi-
tor, and perceived reward motivation, the SEC dismissed his concerns repeatedly beginning
in 1999. See The Man Who Figured Out Madof's Scheme, CBS NEWS, Mar. 1, 2009,
[Vol. 2009:947954
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vestment operations infected the otherwise successful market-making opera-
tions, which employed Madoff s sons Mark and Andrew Madoff.46
What is known is that the bleak economic climate of recent years47
hastened the inevitable collapse of BLMIS in the fall of 2008.48 Clients
otherwise satisfied to let huge sums of money be reinvested from year-to-
year with BLMIS49 suddenly wanted or needed to redeem these sums by the
end of 2008. Madoff was faced with claims for redemptions of $7 billion
from accounts that did not exist,so and he had no conceivable way to raise
that kind of capital. On December 9, 2008, Bernie Madoff told his two sons
that his empire was a sham, a Ponzi scheme." He explained that he was
going to pay out bonuses early to employees, friends, and family before
turning himself into federal authorities. In fact, Madoff wrote $173 million
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/27/60minutes/main4833667.shtml; Erin E. Arved-
lund, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Bernie Madoff Is So Secretive, He Even Asks His Investors to
Keep Mum, BARRON'S, May 7, 2001, at 26 (questioning Madoff's consistently high returns
and his response of 'It's a proprietary strategy. I can't go into it in great detail."'); Michael
Ocrant, Madoff Tops Charts; Skeptics Ask How, MARHEDGE, May 2001, at 1 (reporting that
experts stated that Madoff's stated "split-strike conversion strategy" has never been em-
ployed successfully by others).
46. In its early years, the fund may have operated as a source of capital for the trad-
ing arm, generating returns from that business that were given back to investors.
47. According to prosecutors, BLMIS also suffered a "liquidity crisis" beginning in
November 2005, which caused BLMIS to secure a bank letter of credit, collateralized by
$154 million worth of bonds forwarded by a client for deposit. BLMIS used these borrowed
funds to meet withdrawal requests until able to repay the bank with new investment funds in
April 2006. The client who owned the bonds was never notified of the loan. See Complaint,
United States v. Bonventre, 10 Mag. 385 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/vsad/nys/madoff/bonventrecomplaint.pdf [hereinafter Bonventre
Complaint].
48. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 165 ("Madoff's fraudulent hedge fund might
have continued had the stock markets not collapsed around the world. But with the crashing
economy, all of a sudden all his investors wanted their money back-and they wanted it
now. The stock market collapse of 2008 squeezed his investors all at the same time-and
they came running to him for money."). In addition, the worsening financial environment
made financial experts increasingly skeptical of Madoff's eternally positive returns. Not
only was it inconceivable that in the fall of 2008 his funds were up 4.5% when the market
was down 30%, but his options trading strategy story depended on a liquidity in the market
that just was not there. See KIRTZMAN, supra note 8, at 218 (quoting a feeder fund manager
as asking a co-worker: "'How do the counterparties at the banks provide enough liquidity to
allow the options to be put on?' . . . 'My understanding is dealing desks are currently doing
almost everything on an order or best efforts basis-and not providing risk capital to any-
one.').
49. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 264 (referring to the accounts that stayed
invested over generations with Madoff as the "sticky money" and noting that in fall 2008,
those clients wanted their money out).
50. See id.
51. See David Margolick, The Madoff Chronicles, Part III: Did the Sons Know?,
VANITY FAIR, July 2009, at 66, 72.
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in checks that day but did not send them.52 His sons immediately repeated
this story, first to an attorney, then to the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's of-
fice." The next day, Bernie Madoff was arrested in his apartment after be-
ing confronted by the FBI. He would eventually be charged with eleven
criminal counts;5 4 Madoff would plead guilty to all eleven."
At the time of this writing, Madoff s insistence that his scheme was a
solitary venture has shaped the ongoing investigation." Though private
lawsuits and the bankruptcy court have targeted family members and feeder
funds for compensation and restitution, criminal prosecutions have thus far
focused on a narrow group of insiders. As of July 2010, federal authorities
have prosecuted only Madoff's accountant, David G. Friehling," DiPasca-
li," another BLMIS director of operations, Daniel Bonventre," and two
52. See Seal & Squillari, supra note 27, at 162-63 (reporting that Madoff's secretary
believes that the signing of those checks was part of some strategy Madoff was employing
because he never signed checks and checks were never left overnight).
53. See Margolick, supra note 51, at 72-73 (reporting that the sons first went to see
Mark's father-in-law, who then contacted his fellow Paul Weiss partner, Martin Flumen-
baum, who arranged for the two to meet with DOJ and SEC officials the next morning).
54. The charges were "securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, mail fraud, wire
fraud, two counts of international money laundering, money laundering, false statements,
perjury, false filing with the SEC, and theft from an employee benefit plan. See Sentencing
Memorandum, supra note 30, at 3-4.
55. See Plea Transcript, supra note 6, at 4, 23.
56. Madoff insists that neither his employees nor his family knew of his scheme.
See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 36 ("How do you excuse deceiving 200 em-
ployees who have spent most of their working life working for me? How do you excuse
lying to your brother and two sons who spent their whole adult life helping to build a suc-
cessful and respectful business? How do you excuse lying and deceiving a wife who stood
by you for 50 years, and still stands by you?").
57. One accountant, David G. Friehling, entered into a prosecution agreement on
Nov. 3, 2009, whereby he pleaded guilty to nine counts of securities fraud, investor adviser
fraud, and tax fraud that could result in a total maximum sentence of 114 years imprison-
ment. See Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, to And-
rew Lankler, Esq., Attorney for David G. Friehling (Nov. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/friehlingdavidpleaagreement.pdf. Though Friehling
maintains that he did not know that Madoff was running a fraudulent scheme and that his
family members were investors in BLMIS, he has agreed to forfeit $3.1 million and plead
guilty. See Diana B. Henriques, Plea from MadoffAccountant May Lead to Tax Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at B2. Friehling's partner, his own father-in-law, Jerome Horowitz,
who had formerly handled the Madoff account, died from cancer on March 12, 2009, the day
that Madoff pleaded guilty. See id.
58. Frank DiPascali waived indictment and pleaded guilty on August 11, 2009, to
ten counts of conspiracy, securities fraud, investment advisory fraud, falsifying books and
records, wire fraud, mail fraud, perjury, and income tax evasion for a possible maximum
term of imprisonment of 125 years and is awaiting sentencing. See DiPascali Plea Tran-
script, supra note 26, at 18-20, 32, 44 ("I am standing here today to say that from the early
1990s until December of 2008 I helped Bernie Madoff, and other people, carry out the fraud
that hurt thousands of people."). In his plea agreement, DiPascali agreed to give substantial
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computer programmers,' with helping Madoff perpetrate the fraud. The
SEC charged two feeder funds in civil proceedings, though the court seems
skeptical of aiding and abetting allegations against them."
B. Madoff's Scheme as Affinity Fraud
Madoff's fraudulent financial scheme was a particular type of scheme
known as an "affinity fraud." In this type of fraud, confidence men (or
women) gain the trust of people within their own community, whether it's a
neighborhood, club, or religious organization.62 Affinity frauds are common
frauds because the scheme is facilitated by the implicit trust and decreased
skepticism of the community, coupled with familiarity of known investors.63
Madoff initially recruited clients in the 1960s from the circle of mostly Jew-
ish friends and acquaintances of his accountant father-in-law. As Madoff's
reputation grew, his stable of clients grew from wealthy Jewish families on
Manhattan's Upper East Side to Palm Beach, Florida, to Aspen, Colorado.
Foundations begun by Steven Spielberg (the Wunderkind Foundation) and
Elie Wiesel (Foundation for Humanity) were clients, as was Yeshiva Uni-
assistance and cooperation to the government, but was not granted bail, over prosecutors'
objections. See id. at 40-41.
59. Bonventre was charged with eight criminal counts, including securities fraud,
making false filings with the SEC, making false books and records of a broker-dealer, and
tax fraud. See Bonventre Complaint, supra note 47, at 4-8. See also Diane B. Henriques,
Another MadoffAide Faces Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2010, at BI (reporting that
Bonventre's attorney claimed his client, a thirty-year BLMIS employee, is "absolutely inno-
cent").
60. See Complaint at 1-7, United States v. O'Hara, 09 Mag. 2484 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/oharaperezcomplaint.pdf
(charging the two defendants with one count of conspiracy to falsify books and records of a
broker-dealer and of an investment adviser, one count of falsifying books and records of a
broker-dealer, and one count of falsifying books and records of an investment adviser).
61. A federal district court in New York dismissed the majority of fraud claims
brought against Cohmad Securities Corporation, its principals, and recruiter Robert Jaffe.
SEC v. Cohmad Sec. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 5680, 2010 WL 363844, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
2010) (holding that "the complaint supports the reasonable inference that Madoff fooled the
defendants as he did the individual investors, financial institutions, and regulators"). Stanley
Chais, a feeder based in California, has also been charged by the SEC. Complaint, SEC v.
Chais, 09 Civ. 5681 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2009/comp.21096.pdf.
62. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Why Affinity-Based
Securities and Investment Fraud Constitutes a Hate Crime, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073,
1074 (2003) (defining "affinity fraud" as "securities and investment fraud that targets identi-
fiable racial, ethnic, or religious groups perpetrated by members of the group or people
claiming to want to assist members of the group").
63. See Deborah Sontag, Immigrants Swindle Their Own, Preying on Trust: Race,
Religion and Ethnic Background Give Con Artists an Inside Track to Victims, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1992, at Bl (describing seven affinity frauds investigated by the SEC between 1987
and 1992 that targeted immigrants from India, Poland, El Salvador, China, and Vietnam).
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versity and Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America. Each
of his clients, even his closest friends and relatives, were victims; none had
actual client accounts and none of their investments were immune from the
fraud. Madoff rendered penniless the heirs of his mentor, Norman F. Levy,
his best friend Carl Shapiro, retirees he met at the Palm Beach Country
Club, and even a widow he convinced to invest in the scheme during its last
weeks. Because of his "largely Jewish clientele," comparisons to Hitler
have been frequent;" however, unlike Hitler, Madoff bilked not faceless
stranger-victims, but friends and friends of friends that he looked in the eye
and to whom he owed a fiduciary duty as a financial advisor.
In arguing for the maximum sentence of 150 years, the prosecution fo-
cused on the particular evils of affinity fraud: "Moreover, Madoff's crimes
were personal, to the account holders (both small and large) to whom he
owed a fiduciary duty, and with many of whom he and his firm had a per-
sonal relationship over the course of years.""5 In addition, the prosecution
noted several times that some of the victims were foundations and charitable
institutions."6
Affinity fraud causes the same economic harm as any financial fraud,
but the social harm may be even greater. Victims feel doubly wronged be-
cause they were betrayed by someone they had felt a bond with, someone
they honored with their trust." Especially if the group has historically been
the target of discrimination, the victims may feel particular shame and a
sense of harm, which the perpetrator, as a member of the community, knows
and appreciates." In fact, the perpetrator may be able to gain the trust and
confidence of his fellow community members by preying on a sense that
others outside the group would not have their best interests at heart and
64. This comparison is probably not just an example of reductio ad Hiderum or
Godwin's Law that as an argument increases in length the probability that someone will
analogize to Hitler or the Nazis increases. In this case, speakers are attempting to make a
not-inapposite comparison of someone who did great harm to the Jewish people, albeit fman-
cial harm.
65. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 9.
66. Id. ("'The main tragedy for our family and our community is the loss of our
Family Foundation. With over five million dollars invested with Madoff, the entire Principal
of the Foundation, we are no longer able to support the various organizations which de-
pended on us. These include Food Banks, Homeless Shelters, Homes for the aged, Various
Jewish Organizations and a wonderful program for teaching outdoor winter sports to the
disabled including all disabilities and more recently for disabled veterans."' (quoting one
victim impact statement)).
67. See Fairfax, supra note 62, at 1127-28 ("The law recognizes that crimes violat-
ing trust or trust relationships generate greater harm than crimes that do not involve trust.").
68. See id. at 1140 (arguing that perpetrators in the same target class understand the
prejudicial biases that are directed at the class, use them to their advantage, and recognize
that the harm caused will be enhanced because of those biases).
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would take advantage of the investor-victims." Even members of the group
who were not victims of the fraud may feel negative effects."o He probably
victimized his fellow members of the Jewish faith not out of animus toward
the faith but out of opportunism." Nevertheless, members of the Jewish
community felt the ripple effects of the fraud and feared that public reaction
to Madoff's crime would result in enhanced anti-Semitism and further nega-
tive stereotyping of Jewish participants in the financial markets.72
Madoff certainly used his social network to bring in new clients, creat-
ing an aura of exclusivity even while heavily marketing to his own through
recruiters." He turned down many wealthy clients, perhaps choosing those
investors who were the least financially savvy, the least inquisitive, and the
least demanding.74
II. VICTIMS SHAPE THE MADOFF NARRATIVE
The response to the revelation of Madoff's decades-long fraud was
understandably hostile, both from victims and from the broader public.
Unfortunately, but not unrelated, the discovery of Madoff's crimes in De-
cember 2008 came on the heels of one of the largest economic downturns in
U.S. financial history." The 2008 year began with a 300-point drop in the
Dow index on January 17. The real crash would happen later, with the Dow
plunging 504 points on September 16. During the next few days, the exiting
Bush administration would "bail out" AIG for $85 billion, but not Lehman
69. See Sontag, supra note 63, at BI (reporting that one affinity fraud victim told
investigators that the fraudster, also an Indian immigrant, had explained to him the "greed"
and "fear" at work in Wall Street, making him trust that the fraudster had his interests in
mind).
70. See Fairfax, supra note 62, at 1130-33 (explaining some of the negative social
effects of affinity fraud, such as reluctance to invest and network in the future and stigmati-
zation as gullible and unintelligent).
71. See id. at 1138 (analyzing whether affinity crimes should be treated as hate
crimes based on whether the perpetrator acted out of animus to the group or out of opportun-
ism).
72. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 19-20 ("A righteous Jew, when in
reality nobody has done more to reinforce the ugly stereotype that all we care about is money
the fact is there are no people on this earth more charitable?") (statement of investor-victim).
73. See Complaint at 10, SEC v. Cohmad Sec. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 5680 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 2, 2010) (describing how Madoff "representatives" like Robert Jaffe "offhandedly men-
tioned that they were affiliated with Madoff" and might "agree to put in a good word with
Madoff" as a "clever marketing strategy").
74. See id. at 18 (alleging that Madoff told feeders not to solicit sophisticated inves-
tors or those with a finance or banking background).
75. As Warren Buffett once remarked, "After all, you only find out who is swim-
ming naked when the tide goes out." Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Ha-
thaway, Inc., to Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com200lar/2001letter.html.
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Brothers, who would declare bankruptcy. On September 19, President Bush
announced a $700 billion plan to save the financial industry and the U.S.
economy. On September 29, the House of Representatives voted not to
approve the plan, and the Dow plunged another 777 points. Congress even-
tually passed the "bailout bill" the following week, but the economic crisis
would continue for months. As individuals watched their 401(k) values
plummet and their house values diminish, panic set in. Madoff victims,
however, held financial statements claiming that they had positive returns in
September 2008. But as they rushed to take their funds out of the market,
they soon found out, on December 12, 2008, that not only did they not have
positive returns for 2008, but they had no funds at all.
Unlike other fraud victims who feel too ashamed at their own ignor-
ance and greed to grouse too loudly, Madoff victims could find confidence
in numbers. Victims could not feel too ashamed at having been swindled
when highly respected persons such as Elie Weisel and Steven Spielberg
were swindled for more. Victims converged on the internet and even gained
representation from an attorney in their midst and from well-known law
firms. They started websites, wrote letters, and protested in front of the
courthouse during Madoff hearings. In short, they mobilized and told their
stories.
Madoff's victims were given several opportunities to be heard during
his prosecution and sentencing. Madoff entered a plea of guilty on March
12, 2009, and the court allowed victims to speak on the limited issue of
whether the guilty plea should be accepted to be heard in open court."
However, many victims felt that the guilty plea robbed them of the intangi-
ble benefits of a trial77 and perhaps kept Madoff in control of his destiny."
Perhaps because of this, prior to Madoff's sentencing, victims sent e-mails
to the court requesting to be heard and describing their losses." After a
76. See Press Release, United States v. Madoff, 90 Cr. 213 (Mar. 11, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/madoffpressreleasecourt.pdf (explaining how
victims wishing to speak as to whether the court should accept a guilty plea and as to wheth-
er the defendant should be released on bail could place their names on a sign-in sheet the
next morning before the plea hearing would begin); see also Plea Transcript, supra note 6, at
39-41 (transcribing testimony by two victims who wanted the court to reject the plea). The
court remanded Madoff to prison awaiting sentencing, and unsurprisingly, no victim present
objected. See id. at 49.
77. See Plea Transcript, supra note 6, at 40 ("If we go to trial, we will show our
people in this struggling country and the world, who looks to us as the global moral leader,
that we hold all people accountable. If we go to trial, we can show all our world that all
crimes, all crimes, including crimes of greed, can be dissected, ruled upon, and punished.")
(statement of investor-victim).
78. See id. at 39 (transcribing testimony of victim at plea hearing that she did not
want the plea to end the search for additional wrongdoers and conspirators).
79. Judge Chin had ordered that victims be contacted via the internet to identify
themselves to the court and to request to be heard in court, if desired. See Order Regarding
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request from news sources to make these e-mails, which were under seal,
available to the public, victims were asked for permission to unseal their
statements.so From those released e-mails the prosecution chose 113 to
present to the Court as victim impact statements."
A. Victim Impact Statements
From these statements, certain patterns emerge: First, many victims
felt that Madoff was somehow responsible for the economic downturn."
Even those that did not label Madoff a cause of the economic downturn
associated their troubles with the double-whammy of Madoff fraud and
recession."
Second, many believed that Madoff's fraud proves him to be of unpa-
ralleled evil." Victims repeatedly referred to Madoff as a monster" and a
murderer"6 and even compared him to Adolph Hitler." Victims had been
Victim Notification, United States v. Madoff, 08 Mag. 2735 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009), avail-
able at http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/nys/madoffl030609order.pdf.
80. See Memorandum Decision at 10-12, United States v. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff
/madoffsealeditemsfinal2.pdf (unsealing emails in unredacted form from senders who either
consented to disclosure or who did not respond to the court's inquiry).
81. U.S. Attorney's Letter and Attached Victim Impact Statements, United States v.
Madoff, 09 Cr. 213 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009), available at http://msnbcmedia.
msn.com/i/CNBC/Sections/News And _Analysis/News/EDIT%2OEnglewood%20Cliffs/
STOCK%2OBLOG/Madoff.pdf [hereinafter Victim Impact Statements].
82. See id at 5, Letter from Ronnie Sue and Dominic Ambrosino to Judge Chin
(June 8, 2009) ("I can use every superlative in the dictionary, but none would suffice to tell
you how damaging Madoff's scheme was, not only to those who invested with him, but to
the entire country. His actions have changed our financial structure and have hurt us all.");
id. at 64, Letter from Richard B. Shapiro to Judge Chin (June 4, 2009) ("Madoff has shat-
tered many people's lives and their 'American Dream.' Our financial markets lay naked
with respect to integrity and protection for investors, and our country will suffer for many
years ahead the consequences of this crime.").
83. See id. at 99, Letter from Robert F. and Suzanne T. Hicks to Senators Baucus,
Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee members (Mar. 13, 2009) ("Also we
must consider selling our house in the present market, or try to find employment in the cur-
rent economy.").
84. See, e.g., id. at 27, E-mail from Allan Goldstein to Judge Chin (June 10, 2009)
("[M]r. [M]adoff has committed a crime against humanity considering all the lives he has
wrecked along with charities he destroyed. [Hie should be made to pay for his wicked
deeds.").
85. See id at 13, Letter from Jesse L. Cohen, Marcia Cohen, and Larry Cohen to
Judge Chin (June 10, 2009) ("Madoff is a thief and a monster."); id. at 34, Letter from Nor-
ma Hill to Judge Chin (June 2, 2009) ("[T]here is nothing human about this man. He is truly
a monster.").
86. See id. at 31, E-mail from Stephanie Halio to Judge Chin (June 1, 2009) ("He
killed us.... Madoff has killed tens of dozens of charities, three generations in so many
families."); id. at 41, Letter from Phyllis Lerner to Judge Chin (June 6, 2009) ("You, Bernard
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asked to comment on Madoff s sentencing, but many admitted believing
that no prison term would be proportionate to the magnitude of Madoff s
crime." Some victims referred to the ongoing and continuous nature of the
Ponzi scheme as proving that it was equivalent to thousands and thousands
of individual crimes."
Third, the victim statements agree that the losses incurred by Madoff s
victims are of unparalleled devastation. Again, some seem to equate their
situations with those of Holocaust survivors." Many describe the effects of
the fraud as catastrophic, and more than a few wonder aloud why they are
not eligible for government assistance, just as victims of natural disasters"
and terrorist acts are.92
Madoff . ... You are a murderer. There have already been two suicides that have been
publicly attributed to your deeds. . . . You are a rapist. You have stolen one of the most
intimate of personal properties, the self esteem and fruits of a life's work. You have ravaged
dreams[.] You are a larcenist. . . . You committed 'generational theft."') (emphasis omit-
ted).
87. See id. at 20, Letter from Natalie Erger to Judge Chin (undated) ("History shows
us that there are monsters who think that they are above the law. Laws of humanity and
common decency don't apply to them because they have created their own world in which
they are the Supreme Being. There are many examples, Adolph Hitler, Saddam Hussein and
Bernard Madoff.... Extreme, I don't think so. Bernard Madoff annihilated thousands for
his own gain just as surely as the aforementioned did. He has destroyed the achievements of
generations past and the promises of generations to come.").
88. See id at 16, Letter from Michael De Vita to Judge Chin (June 1, 2009) ("Mr.
Madoff was a thief. Not just an ordinary thief who stole money. This man stole people[']s
lives, eviscerated retirement plans, and ruined family wealth and inheritance... . A theft of
this magnitude simpl[y] cannot be adequately punished by our legal system. The most that
you can do is ensure that he never takes a breath of air as a free man. While insufficient, it is
not only the most that you can do, it is also the least that you should do."); id. at 31, E-mail
from Stephanie Halio to Judge Chin (June 1, 2009) ("We worked and saved for all of [our]
lives to be secure in our old age and this monster, this criminal, Bernie Madoff took every-
thing away from tens of thousands of people across this country and the world. If he were
tortured for the rest of his life, it wouldn't be enough punishment.").
89. See id at 26, Email from Abby Frucht to Judge Chin (June 1, 2009) (estimating
based on falsified weekly statements for twenty years, "that Bernard Madoff lied to them,
and stole from them, one thousand and forty separate times. He deserves to stay in prison for
at least that many years.").
90. See id. at 19-20, Letter from Natalie Erger to Judge Chin (undated) ("It's very
hard to go on. Madoff investors are victims of a catastrophic event. . . . [L]ike the Holocaust
survivors before us we won't be alive to see restitution and if we are the process is only
adding to our hardship."); id. at 31, E-mail from Stephanie Halio to Judge Chin (June 1,
2009) ("He is cruel, amoral and a killer.... It's like people in the concentration camps
during WW H watching the Nazis enjoying themselves using the property, money and other
possessions that they had stolen.").
91. See id. at 39, Email from K. Kohl to Judge Chin (June 10, 2009) ("When a disas-
ter hits Federal and state governments step in to help those devastated by the disaster offering
housing, low interest loans and grants. No such relief has been provided to the victims of the
Madoff disaster."). See also Rachelle Younglai, Madoff Victims Seek Help from Congress,
REuTERs, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE5B83EH20091209
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But of course none of Madoff s crimes were violent or resulted in
physical harm or death, so comparisons to the Holocaust and the tragedies
of September 11, 2001 seem quite misplaced and even offensive. However,
many of the Madoff victims seem to honestly believe that the harm of hav-
ing one's financial security disappear, particularly as the result of a betrayal
by a trusted advisor, is a fate worse than death." In fact, quite a few men-
tioned elderly parents or spouses as being lucky that they had died before
the fraud was discovered.94
The spectre of continuing life with financial uncertainty seems almost
too much for some of the victims to bear. Admittedly, financial conditions
of the victims seem to range from relatively unchanged to painfully dire.
However, the terror of the victim suddenly faced with a life on a reduced
income seems as tangible as the humiliation of the victim on government
assistance. Many of the statements refer to lifelong savings disappearing;
moreover, many of the victims were related, so middle-aged victims lost
college savings at the same time that their parents lost their retirement sav-
ings, leaving them to support three generations." Victims at retirement age
now face re-entering the job force96 or living on Social Security payments."
(quoting a lawyer for many of the victims as saying "her clients were not only hit by a 'fi-
nancial tsunami' when they found out Madoff swindled them, but by a 'second tsunami'
when" they realized that the government insurance program Securities Investor Protection
Corp. would not reimburse every claimant under its rules).
92. See Victim Impact Statements, supra note 81, at 110, Letter from John and
Beverly Neal to Senators Baucus, Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee
members (undated) ("It seems that victims of natural disasters in this country and even the
poor victims of Sept. 11 had more opportunity for help and assistance than the innocent
victims of these terrible frauds perpetrated by what is no less th[a]n financial terrorists.").
93. See id. at 71, Email from Jackie Stone to Judge Chin (June 10, 2009) ("It was
the beginning of a new kind of death-our family, including my dad, mom, brother, aunt,
uncle, cousins-were ALL dead-in one shot. Bernie had killed our family, life, emotions,
survival, resource for food, shelter, medicine and our belief in other humans. He
DESTROYED our lives in one second!!!!!").
94. See, e.g., id at 36, Letter from Carla R. Hirschhorn to Judge Chin (June 1, 2009)
("I am so thankful that my father died two years ago and was spared from having to live in
his terminal condition without the money to provide him 24/7 healthcare, which allowed him
to die in dignity."); id. at 43, Email from David Levin to Judge Chin (June 4, 2009) ("Fortu-
nately, my father died on February 2, 2008 and was spared the shock of this situation. He
was 89 and lived a good long life and this news would have destroyed him psychological-
ly.").
95. See id. at 13, Letter from Jesse L. Cohen, Marcia Cohen, and Larry Cohen to
Judge Chin (June 10, 2009) ("When you determine Madoff's sentence, I hope you will keep
in mind that he has taken not only my twenty-five years of savings, but also the lifetime of
savings of my eighty-year-old parents.").
96. See id. at 112, Letter from Donald L. Nicolay, MD and Lynn I. Nicolay to Sena-
tors Baucus, Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee members (Mar. 16,
2009) ("We have had to re-enter the market force at ages 67 and 62.... We have been
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Objectively, losing savings that one does not depend on for day-to-day ex-
penses" seems less of a disaster than death, disability, or other physical
catastrophes, such as stroke, cancer, or heart ailments. Victims' stories of
selling homes and cars, re-entering the work force, delaying retirement until
age seventy or beyond,99 limiting charitable donations,'o vacations,'o and
gifts to grandchildren"0 2 may not seem like horror stories given that many
Americans face even more dire economic realities every day. Moreover,
some victims' losses might even be amusing to the average American.103
forced to curtail our overseas medical mission endeavors to third world countries, which
have included short-term stints in Mexico, Peru, Rwanda and Afghanistan.").
97. See id. at 99, Letter from Robert F. and Suzanne T. Hicks to Senators Baucus,
Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee members (Mar. 13, 2009) ("As a
result, our retirement has been turned into a survival situation. No retirement trips, no finan-
cial help to children and grandchildren, and the need to survive only on social security in-
come. Also we must consider selling our house in the present market, or try to find employ-
ment in the current economy.").
98. See id. at 23, Email from Phyllis Feiner to Judge Chin (June 10, 2009) ("Our
investment in Madoff grew from inheritance money, which represented my father's life
savings. Our comfort zone has been destroyed by Bernard Madoff.").
99. See id. at 88, Letter from Tim and Patty Daley to Senators Baucus, Grassley, and
United States Senate Finance Committee members (undated) ("After selling the business my
plan was to spend more time with the kids I had no time for over the last 20 years. That is
not going to happen. I continue to work and will for years to come to keep my promise [to
fund education] to my girls.").
100. See id. at 108, Letter from Conard and Patricia Metcalf to Senators Baucus,
Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee members (Mar. 13, 2009) ("We no
longer are able to contribute to any charities. Not even our church. And we are going to
have to sell our home, in this depressed real estate market, simply to pay the costs of daily
living.").
101. See id. at 101, Letter from Ross P. and Dorothy J. Jackson to Senators Baucus,
Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee members (Mar. 14, 2009) ("While
we are very physically active people and in general good health, we have had to amend our
life style by eliminating all charitable contributions, eating out and extensive travel.").
102. See id. at 76, Letter from Judith Welling to Judge Chin (June 5, 2009) ("We
have now seen most of our nest egg destroyed and along with it our ability to help fund the
education of our nine grand children, make charitable gifts and enjoy a worry free retirement.
No punishment could be severe enough to compensate for what transpired."); id. at 19, Letter
from Natalie Erger to Judge Chin (undated) ("My grandson has a learning disability and I
have always helped with money for tutors. My children and grandchildren come to visit for
the holidays and I always paid for the air line tickets. How often will I get to see them now?
We have eleven grandchildren you can imagine checks for birthdays and holidays. We have
always given. I think that is the hardest thing of all. It's bad enough that we can't give any-
more we now have to come to our children and siblings for money to survive.").
103. See id at 64, Letter from Richard B. Shapiro to Judge Chin (June 4, 2009) (ask-
ing the Court without irony "How do we explain to our 8 year old son that we had to 'send
away his horse' since it was a luxury we could no longer afford?"); id. at 117, Letter from
Ted and Sue Rehage to Senators Baucus, Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Com-
mittee members (Mar. 13, 2009) ("As a result, our traveling will be curtailed with no more 9
or 10 weeks with the grandkids which is disappointing for all of us. Now it will be a week or
two in state at best.").
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However, the trauma caused by Madoff seems to be more complex
than mere financial loss. Victims want to tell life stories of how they
scrimped and saved for a pleasant retirement. Now, this scrimping and sav-
ing seems all for naught as the comfortable end-of-life they expected is now
out of reach;" in other words, the American Dream was stolen from
them. 1s Their nest-egg losses seem to make them question a lifetime's
worth of decisions."o' Perhaps more importantly, they have been robbed of
security in their senior years.o1 Days that should be relaxing and calm are
now suffused with worry over bills and expenses.0 s The loss of investment
income may also signal the end of independence as victims find they must
move in with relatives. Though the statements themselves may seem a cata-
log of large and small diminishments in fortune with which many are famil-
iar, perhaps the victims were helpless to fully articulate the impact of the
loss of financial security and independence, and thus relied on mundane
facts to tell the story.
B. Sentencing "Extraordinary Evil"
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, prosecutors calculated the
maximum sentence for the eleven counts as 150 years and recommended
that sentence.' Madoff s attorneys asked for twelve years."o At the sen-
tencing hearing on June 29, 2009, Judge Chin granted the right to speak to
104. See id. at 46, Letter from Sue Marshall to Judge Chin (June 3, 2009) ("I am a
victim that lost everything, not just money, but my goal of living my senior years with the
ability to provide basic common necessities for myself. Dreams are gone, a sense of security
is gone and the void is filled with fears, questions, uncertainty and sadness.").
105. Several victims mentioned the American Dream. See, e.g., id. at 52, Letter from
William and Grace Mishkin to Judge Chin (June 2, 2009) ("He has deprived us of the Amer-
ican expectation of a reasonably comfortable old age.").
106. See id. at 53, E-mail from Candace Newlove to Wendy Olsen (June 1, 2009)
("[T]he saddest part of all of this is that [I] made a choice to work 80 hours a week to provide
for my girls and [I] missed out on their growing up and now [I] have nothing to give to them
in exchange for them not having me around. . . .").
107. See id. at 15, Letter from Emma De Vita to Judge Chin (undated) ("The money
invested with Madoff was accumulated over a lifetime to ensure a secure personal retirement
and as a means of helping to fund the education of my great grandchildren. These two
achievable goals are nothing but a distant dream caused by the nightmare of Madoffs ac-
tions.").
108. See id. at 17, Letter of Sheila Ennis to Judge Chin (Mar. 10, 2009) ("Because of
this theft, my Mother's life has drastically changed and I have seen her age and become more
and more frail right before my eyes. She is very scared and has totally lost her indepen-
dence. She will have to move into my or my sister's home which is not how she intended to
live out her years. My Mother and Father worked so hard throughout their lives so that they
could enjoy their retirement and have funds to pass on to the next generation as well as sup-
port many worthy causes.").
109. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 1.
110. See id. at 15.
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all victims who requested to be heard. As expected, they all urged the Court
to sentence Madoff to the maximum sentence in a maximum security pris-
on."' After Madoff made a very short statement, in which he confessed to
"an error in judgment,"" 2 Judge Chin sentenced Madoff, then seventy-one
years old, to the maximum sentence of 150 years;"' under the federal sys-
tem, he will not be eligible for release during his natural lifetime.
Judge Chin noted several things in defending the sentence. First, he
said that no other financial fraud case from the Southern District of New
York was "comparable to this case in terms of the scope, duration and
enormity of the fraud, and the degree of the betrayal."" 4 Second, Judge
Chin noted that unlike other financial fraud cases, no one testified or wrote
letters on Madoff's behalf as to his character or otherwise."s Third, Judge
Chin foreshadows his sentence by stating that the symbolism of a large sen-
tence is necessary to send a message "that Mr. Madoff' s crimes were extra-
ordinarily evil, and that this kind of irresponsible manipulation of the sys-
tem is not merely a bloodless financial crime that takes place just on paper,
but that it is instead, as we have heard, one that takes a staggering human
toll.""'
But most interestingly, Judge Chin talks about the victims, and uses
their own language, their own narrative. Judge Chin refers to the "stagger-
ing human toll" that "we have heard" in the courtroom that day from the
victims."' He personalizes the victims, telling their stories for them:
I received letters, and we have heard from, for example, a retired forest work-
er, a corrections officer, an auto mechanic, a physical therapist, a retired New York
City school secretary, who is now 86 years old and widowed, who must deal with
the loss of her retirement funds. Their money is gone, leaving only a sense of be-
trayal.
I was particularly struck by one story that I read in the letters. A man invested
his family's life savings with Mr. Madoff. Tragically, he died of a heart attack just
two weeks later. The widow eventually went in to see Mr. Madoff. He put his arm
around her, as she describes it, and in a kindly manner told her not to worry, the
money is safe with me. And so not only did the widow leave the money with him,
Ill. See, e.g., Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 20-21 ("We urge your Honor to
commit Madoff to prison for the remainder of his natural life, and when he leaves this earth
virtually unmourned, may Satan grow a fo[u]rth mouth where Bernard L. Madoff deserves to
spend the rest of eternity.") (statement of investor-victim).
112. Id. at 37 ("I believed when I started this problem, this crime, that it would be
something I would be able to work my way out of, but that became impossible.... I made a
terrible mistake, but it wasn't the kind of mistake that I had made time and time again, which
is a trading mistake.... My error was much more serious. I made an error ofjudgment.").
113. See id. at 49.
114. Id. at 46.
115. See id. ("The absence of such support is telling.").
116. Id. at 47.
117. Id.
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she eventually deposited more funds with him, her 401(k), her pension funds.
Now, all the money is gone. She will have to sell her home, and she will not be
able to keep her promise to help her granddaughter pay for college.118
The effect of these victim impact statements on Judge Chin's sentence was
obviously substantial.
The judge in Frank DiPascali's case also invited victims to tell their
stories."' At the hearing at which DiPascali waived indictment and pleaded
guilty to ten criminal counts, one victim asked to be heard. 12 0 This Madoff
client, Miriam Seigman, was disturbed that the two men who knew the most
about the fraud would escape trial, giving the victims no information as to
how or why this fraud was perpetrated.'2 1 Judge Sullivan replied that a
criminal trial could not serve the goals of a more ambitious tribunal, like a
truth commission, 1" possibly drawing an analogy to extreme situations in
which truth commissions have operated such as post-genocide Rwanda and
post-apartheid South Africa. Having reinforced the idea that Madoff's fraud
"decimated" families in the same way that war and genocide have, Judge
Sullivan may have been swayed by this narrative as he denied bail, even
though the prosecutor objected because DiPascali was a cooperating witness
for the government. 123 Both DiPascali and the government asked for recon-
sideration of bail, and again Judge Sullivan asked if any victims would like
to give a statement on whether DiPascali should be free on bail pending
sentencing.124
118. Id. at 48.
119. See DiPascali Plea Transcript, supra note 26, at 59-60. Pursuant to a notice on
the Department of Justice's website page devoted to Madoff proceedings, the judge invited
victims who wanted to be heard at DiPascali's plea hearing to attend that hearing. Id. at 59.
In addition, the judge put out a sign-in sheet at the hearing and even asked those attending if
they would like to raise their hand and be heard. Id.
120. See id. at 59.
121. See id. at 61-63 ("These crimes have affected thousands of men, women, and
children, whole generations of families have been decimated, children, parents, dependents
who are ill. None of these victims knows how or why this has happened to them. The de-
fendants won't say a word until today, even then very little, and the prosecutors have said
very little to victims.").
122. Id. at 64.
123. See id. at 91 (ordering remand without prejudice).
124. See Order, United States v. DiPascali, 09 Cr. 764 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20091217orderrereconsiderationofbail.
pdf.
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C. Restitution, Remission, and Compensation
1. Restitution
Madoff victims have two avenues of possible compensation for their
losses. First, the Department of Justice will seize assets of the defendant
and remit liquidated funds from those assets pro rata to claimants who suf-
fered a pecuniary loss as a direct result of the illegal act. In this case, resti-
tution is mandatory,125 but given the complexity of the case, restitution was
not available at sentencing and has been directed to the DOJ as part of a
remission of forfeiture proceeding,'26 which is now part of the bankruptcy
proceedings. This process is understandably lengthy, given the number of
claimants and the difficulty in seizing Madoff's assets. In addition, this
process will not provide full compensation for even the victims' principal
investments. Although the Final Order of Forfeiture entered on June 26,
2009, contained forfeiture allegations totaling a money judgment against
Madoff in the amount of $177 billion, 27 only a fraction of that will ever be
recovered. 28
While Madoff's records showed 4,902 active customer accounts as of
December 11, 2008, 8,094 customer accounts were active during the period
from 2000-2008. However, 15,870 claimants filed applications for restitu-
tion. Part of this difference is because eighty-three of the active customer
accounts were not in the name of individuals, but in the name of other fi-
nancial firms-the "feeder funds"-which invested their own clients' funds
in BLMIS. Determining eligibility of each of these claimants, and the
amount of each claim, is ongoing.
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2006).
126. See Order, United States v. Madoff, 90 Cr. 213 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090924orderforegoingmandatory
restitutionecf.pdf (ordering that restitution was impracticable and ordering that the govern-
ment proceed through the process of remission as authorized under the forfeiture statutes).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 853(i) (2006).
127. See Government's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion Pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3663A(c)(3) at 6, United States v. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213,
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090922
remissionbrieffinalwithexs.pdf.
128. As of November 11, 2009, the Madoff trustee reported having $18.7 billion
under his control. See Statement of Proposed Testimony of Stephen P. Harbeck: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterpris-
es of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Stephen P. Har-
beck, President and CEO of Securities Investor Protection Corporation).
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2. SIPC Compensation
Second, some of the Madoff victims have recourse to compensation
by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), an entity created
and governed by the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA)." Although
investment accounts are not guaranteed by the FDIC in the same ways as
are deposit accounts at commercial banks, investment accounts are pro-
tected by the SIPC up to $500,000."o Though not characterized as insur-
ance, SIPC acts to advance funds to investors of failed firms quickly, up to
the statutory limit. Should the firm's assets be insufficient to advance any
additional funds, investors' only satisfaction will be from SIPC funds. In
the Madoff SIPC liquidation, victims dispute the calculation of their losses
by the SIPC Trustee, Irving Picard."'
Victims argue that their losses are equal to the amounts they were told
were in their BLMIS accounts as of their last statement.132 Conversely, the
SIPC takes the position, which has some unclear case law precedent,13 that
the victims' losses are equal to the principal amounts they invested minus
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (2006).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (2006) (providing that SIPC should advance to a bankruptcy
trustee up to $500,000 for each customer to satisfy claims according to a customer's "net
equity").
131. For example, a group of victims asked Judge Chin to reconsider his September
24, 2009 Order for the government to proceed through the process of remission given that
restitution by sentencing was impracticable. See Order at 1-2, United States v. Madoff, 09
Cr. 213 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoffl
20091028chinorderdenyingreconsiderationofremissionruling.pdf. The victims, however, did
not disagree with the court but wanted to object to the court possibly appointing Irving Pa-
card, the SIPA Trustee, as the Trustee for remission of forfeiture. Id. at 2 (denying victims'
motion for reconsideration and declining to intervene in the government's appointment of
Irving Picard).
132. See Chaitman Testimony, supra note 14 (arguing that SIPC has no legal basis to
calculate net equity as anything other than amounts listed on monthly statements).
133.In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2004) (determining claims for
investors whose advisor had promised to purchase specific securities of a fictitious mutual
fund and to purchase specific legitimate securities, but never purchased any securities).
Unfortunately, this case is similar, but not identical to the Madoff case, in which Madoff
never promised any investor anything specific with regard to investing the money, but rec-
orded fictitious trades in specific legitimate securities in historical financial statements.
Additional Reforms to the Securities Investor Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on
Financial Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Michael A. Conley, Deputy Solicitor,
SEC), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs dem/conley testimony. pdf ("The
Madoff liquidation does not fall neatly within the situations expressly addressed by SIPA or
dealt with in cases interpreting the statute.").
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the distributions they have taken over the years.'34 Though victims were
invited to speak at Madoff's sentencing only on the topic of sentencing,
many could not resist addressing the issue of the SIPC calculations.'
For example, if an investor placed a $100,000 inheritance with Madoff
in 1985 and believed that in 2008 it had grown to $400,000, then the inves-
tor argues the loss is $400,000, but SIPC argues the loss is $100,000. In
addition, if that investor took out $50,000 in 2001 to send a child to college,
then SIPC argues the loss is $50,000. If the investor sent two children to
college at $50,000 each, then SIPC argues that there is no loss and no valid
claim, regardless of whether the last statement falsely led the investor to
believe that she had a nest egg of $400,000 and regardless of the investor's
actions in reliance on that belief. In addition, the loss is estimated at
$100,000 regardless of inflation or concepts of the time value of money.
The purpose behind SIPC is to provide minimum guarantees that in-
vestment principal has been invested as requested, not to guarantee a return.
Had Madoff been actually investing the $100,000 for twenty-three years,
that amount may have doubled twice, but it may have dissipated during
economic downturns or because of unwise investment choices. SIPC's goal
is to compensate for fraud, not for either economic downturns or unwise
investment choices. In addition, SIPC has a more basic reason not to com-
pensate for "phantom losses." SIPC does not have enough money to com-
pensate each Madoff investor for those losses."'
Madoff victims may be able to re-shape the law, however. In Decem-
ber 2009, victims lobbied Congress to change SIPC laws to allow victims to
recover based on the amounts they were falsely told were in their invest-
134. See Diana B. Henriques, A Year Under Fire: At SIPC, Chief Struggles with
Madoff Claims and Victims' Pain, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 2009, at B I (quoting Harbeck as
saying that the courts have never allowed phantom Ponzi scheme losses to be calculated to
include phantom returns the investors thought they had earned).
135. See, e.g., Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 16 ("We have been betrayed by
SIPIC, which in order to save money, has invented a new definition of net equity to deprive
us of the $500,000 of insurance of which we were assured.") (statement of investor-victim);
id at 30 ("SIPIC has now redefined what we are entitled to.") (statement of investor-victim).
136. See Younglai, supra note 91 (quoting the chairman of the House Financial Ser-
vices subcommittee as saying "We don't have the funds" to make all victims whole). One
issue surrounding the funding of SIPC is that until recently, members' firms paid a flat fee of
$150 a year, regardless of the size of the firm, a premium that does not contemplate a securi-
ties fraud on the scale of the Madoff fraud. In fact, SIPC normally has a reserve fund of $1.7
billion, with borrowing privileges of an additional $1 billion. See Henriques, supra note 134,
at B 1. However, in response to this shortfall, SIPC has instituted a new assessment of one-
fourth of one percent of net operating revenues, effective beginning with fiscal years ending
in April 2009. See Letter from Armando J. Bucelo, Jr., Chairman, SIPC, to CEOs, SIPC
Member Firms (Mar. 2, 2009) available at http://www.sipc.org/SIPCassessment notice-
march22009.pdf
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ment accounts.1 7  Victims have also complained about the pace of reim-
bursement efforts and the underfunding of SIPC.'38 On February 2, 2010,
represented by heavy-hitting law firms such as Milberg LLP, Davis, Polk &
Wardell, and Sonnenschein Nath Rosenthal LLP, victims were given a
chance to appear in a hearing regarding the calculation of "net equity" in
front of the bankruptcy court.'39 Though the bankruptcy judge ruled in favor
of SIPC on the "net equity" issue,'40 the court certified its ruling to allow for
immediate appeal to the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
SIPC rules also count only direct customers in BLMIS as eligible for
SIPC compensation. In other words, individual clients of feeder funds must
look to that fund for compensation.' 4' SIPC will pay out eligible amounts to
the fund. Therefore, if a particular fund invested $50 million in client
funds, that fund is eligible for a maximum of $500,000 in compensation.14 2
Of course, indirect investors have the ability to sue the fund in which they
invested for fraud or negligence.14
Lastly, the SIPC trustee has the ability to "claw back" funds paid to
investors while the fund was insolvent, going back six years.'" Because the
137. See Younglai, supra note 91 (describing victim testimony in front of the U.S
House of Representatives Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance,
and Government Sponsored Enterprises).
138. See id.
139. See Diana B. Henriques, In Court, Impassioned Challenges of Madoff Trustee's
Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at BI (noting that the court reserved judgment for a later
time in the "Solomonic" decision); see also Memorandum of Law of the SIPC in Support of
Trustee's Motion for an Order Upholding Trustee's Determination Denying "Customer"
Claims at 6, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC, Adv. Pro. No.
08-01789 (SIPA Liquidation) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.sipc.org/pdf/519 Memorandum of Law-1.pdf.
140. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC, No. 08-01789, 2010 WL 694211, at
*3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010).
141. Additional Reforms to the Securities Investor Protection Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H
Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Peter J. Leveton, Co-Chairman
of Agile Funds Investor Committee), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/ hear-
ing/financialsvcsdem/leveton.pdf (testifying that "[a]ll [i]ndirect investors should be en-
titled to the same financial relief as the [d]irect investors" and that Congress should
"[e]liminate [d]iscrimination [a]gainst [i]ndirect [i]nvestors").
142. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Morgan, Kennedy & Co., 533 F.2d 1314, 1317-
21 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the 108 employee beneficiaries of one employee profit-
sharing plan constituted one customer for purposes of SIPC recovery); see also All Things
Considered: SIPC May Rescue Madoff Victims (NPR Radio broadcast Dec. 31, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=98913273 [hereinafter All
Things ConsideredJ (interviewing Professor John Coffee, Jr., who estimated that $7.3 billion
worth of client investments came through indirect investors).
143. See All Things Considered, supra note 142 (noting that "[t]here definitely will
be litigation against . . . feeder funds," particularly the ones that pursued the undiversified
strategy of investing most, if not all, client funds with Madoff).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3) (2006).
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advisory fund was always insolvent, and more so every year, any distribu-
tion to investors was necessarily made from other investors' funds. Theo-
retically, all of the distributions should be returned to one pot, giving all
defrauded investors pro rata slices of the same pie, regardless of whether
they were lucky enough to redeem early.'45 In addition, this mechanism
guards against fraudsters who see the end is near, giving preference to
friends and family.'46 In April 2009, the Madoff trustee sent letters to 223
victims notifying them that money they had received from Madoff may be
subject to clawback, though certain defenses may apply.'4 7 Certain Madoff
feeder funds had received earlier letters. However, as of December 2009,
the trustee had instituted clawback proceedings against only three "small
investors" who initiated proceedings against the trustee, as counterclaims.
Arguably, the trustee has used this power "judiciously" in response to
the enormous public criticism of the clawback threat by the Madoff vic-
tims.148 Many of the victim impact statements focused on the threat of
clawback as a further trauma to their families.1" In addition, attorneys on
behalf of the victims had filed a motion in Madoff's prosecution asking the
judge to reconsider ordering restitution in the case to be administered by
SIPC if the SIPC trustee, Irving Picard, was going to be the trustee.so Per-
145. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Meas-
ures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV.
368, 395-96 (2009) (explaining the difference between winning investors and losing inves-
tors and how disgorgement may benefit innocent losing investors at the expense of innocent
winning investors).
146. Additional Reforms to the Securities Investor Protection Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of John Coffee, Jr., Adolf A.
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School), available at 2009 WL 4647558
(describing the theory behind clawbacks and fraudulent conveyance law as "the crook should
not be able to choose his victims") [hereinafter Coffee Testimony].
147. See Tally M. Wiener, On the Clawbacks in the MadoffLiquidation Proceeding,
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221, 228 (2009).
148. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 146 (describing how the prospect of clawback
"has provoked outrage and shock from many of the persons so sued, who point out that they
did suffer significant losses, which may yet be compounded significantly by the trustee's
actions").
149. See, e.g., Victim Impact Statements, supra note 81, at 36, Letter from Carla and
Stanley Hirschhorn to Judge Chin (June 1, 2009).
150. Memorandum of Law in Support of Victims' Motion for Reconsideration, Unit-
ed States v. Madoff, No. 09-Cr-213 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 3811829. Judge
Chin denied the motion and ordered remission, holding that his order did not purport to de-
termine which victims or categories of victims were not entitled to relief. Order at 2, United
States v. Madoff, 09-Cr-213 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009) ("Finally, to the extent the victims
object to the government's possible retention of Mr. Picard to assist in the remission process,
even assuming I have the power to block the government from doing so, I decline to exercise
that power.").
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haps, fearing additional backlash, the Madoff trustee chose to go after only
the biggest and smelliest fish."'
Unlike other victims of lesser-known fraudulent scams that are dis-
covered by the Securities and Exchange Commission every year, the Ma-
doff victims are having some success framing their plight as one of disaster
in which government intervention is necessary and prudent. In fact, Harvey
Pitt, former chairman of the SEC, has said that officials at SIPC should dis-
regard stringent rules and "stand up for those who have been defrauded by a
master swindler."'52 However, that generosity of spirit may deplete coffers
for those in 2010 who have been defrauded by garden-variety swindlers.'5
3. Tax Relief
Madoff victims have been very vocal and have turned to federal legis-
lators, not only to reform SIPC rules but also to aid them in their search for
tax relief. Though the bankruptcy trustee was not calculating phantom
gains as compensable losses, many victims had paid taxes on the fictitious
returns. In March 2009, after victims urged Congress to create legislation to
help them, the Internal Revenue Service agreed to allow victims to deduct
up to ninety-five percent of their losses immediately, and carry back net
operating losses five years or forward twenty years.'54 More importantly,
the IRS issued guidelines that victims could deduct not only lost principal,
but also phantom losses.'" Therefore, the investor discussed earlier may be
151. Though few individuals have been pursued by Picard, Stanley Chais, Carl Shapi-
ro, and Jeffry Picower not only have been the subject of clawback proceedings, but have also
been indicted. According to the prosecutors, Shapiro and Picower received much higher
returns than other clients routinely received, as much as 950% a year in the case of Picower.
See ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 235. Picower, who took out $6.7 billion from his account
over the years, also may have asked Madoff to generate phantom losses for tax purposes,
suggesting that he knew that it was all a fiction anyway. See id. at 235-36 (reporting that of
that $6.7 billion, $5.1 constituted phantom returns). However, Picower died in October
2009, further complicating any recovery. See Amir Efrati, Lawyer: Heart Attack Killed
Picower, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2009, at C3.
152. See Henriques, supra note 134, at B l.
153. See id. ("'Nobody likes to say no to people who are, without question, victims. .
But this is a zero-sum game-a dollar we give to someone who is not eligible is a dollar
we do not have for someone who is."' (quoting Stephen P. Harbeck of SIPC)).
154. Rev. Rul. 1-165, 2009-9 C.B. 735. See also John D. McKinnon & Jane J. Kim,
Ponzi Scheme Victims Get a Tax Break, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at A4.
155. See Rev. Proc. 2009-20, 2009-14 I.R.B. 749-50:
(1) Qualified investment means the excess, if any, of -
(a) The sum of -
(i) The total amount of cash, or the basis of property, that the qualified investor in-
vested in the arrangement in all years; plus
(ii) The total amount of net income with respect to the specified fraudulent ar-
rangement that, consistent with information received from the specified fraudulent
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able to deduct $400,000. These new guidelines could result in substantial
tax refunds for past tax years and years to come."6
III. THE HISTORY OF THE PONZI SCHEME
Madoff's BLMIS fraud is certainly not the first of its kind. Schemes
that promise passive returns at a high rate of interest are very attractive and
rarely lack for investors,"' and this greed fuels the Peter-Paul scheme.
Though named after Charles (nde Carlo) Ponzi, the "rob Peter to pay
Paul""' scheme predated him."9 Ponzi's fraud was a simple one, and his
story has been retold many times. Born in Italy to a family with social sta-
ture but little wealth, Ponzi failed at university and sought to come to Amer-
ica to make his fortune.' Unfortunately, his lack of work ethic and spend-
thrift ways brought him more trouble than fortune. Fresh off of two prison
stints,'6' Ponzi began life anew in Boston, even marrying the love of his life,
arrangement, the qualified investor included in income for federal tax purposes for
all taxable years prior to the discovery year, including taxable years for which a re-
fund is barred by the statute of limitations; over
(b) The total amount of cash or property that the qualified investor withdrew in all
years from the specified fraudulent arrangement (whether designated as income or
principal).
156. The amount of revenue foregone by the federal government to compensate vic-
tims in this way may amount to as much as $17 billion. See Marcy Gordon, IRS: Madoff
Victims Tax Relief HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 17, 2009, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/17/irs-madoff-victims-tax-re_n_175713.html.
157. Cf BERNARD SHAW, EVERYBODY'S POLITICAL WHAT'S WHAT? 256 (2d ed. 1950)
("A government which robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul.").
158. The origins of the phrase "robbing Peter to pay Paul" are unclear. Though wide-
ly credited to reference the selling of lands at St. Peter's Church in Westminster to pay for
repairs at St. Paul's Cathedral in London, the use of the phrase predates any such transaction.
The first record of the phrase's use is by John Wycliffe in Select English Works (1380) and
may be a variation of a French phrase "as it were that one could crucify Paul in order to
redeem Peter." The phrase may also refer to the fact that during the Reformation, church
taxes were paid both to St. Peter's in Rome and St. Paul's in London, so skimping on one tax
to pay the other would lead to a perverse end.
159. See R. Alexander Pilmer & Mark T. Cramer, Swindlers' List, L.A. LAWYER,
June 2009, at 22, 28 n.1 (describing the fraud of William "520 Percent" Miller, a Boston
swindler whose "Peter-to-Paul" scheme brought in $1 million before it collapsed in 1899).
Another Boston-based scam with which Ponzi may have been familiar was the Woman's
Bank of Boston, managed by Sarah Howe, who paid depositors eight percent returns funded
by new depositors until the scheme imploded. See George Robb, Women and White-Collar
Crime: Debates on Gender, Fraud and the Corporate Economy in England and America,
1850-1930, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1058, 1067 (2006) (citing The Woman's Bank ofBos-
ton, BANKER'S MAG., Nov. 1880, at 351-52).
160. See MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, PONZI's SCHEME: THE TRuE STORY OF A FINANCIAL
LEGEND 22 (2005).
161. Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736, 737 (D. Mass. 1934) (reciting the fact of his
1908 forgery conviction in Montreal, prior to his 1910 re-entry into the United States).
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Rose. However, money problems were plaguing him when he came upon
what seemed like a legitimate arbitrage opportunity. In 1919, residents of
the United States and certain foreign countriesl could purchase an Interna-
tional Reply Coupon 6 at their local post office and send it to loved ones or
business colleagues in the other countries. The recipient could then redeem
the coupon for return postage, thereby allowing U.S. letter writers to send
an equivalent of a "self-addressed, stamped envelope" to increase the speed
of a reply. Ponzi realized that because of currency fluctuations, a dollar
could buy sixty-six of these coupons in Italy, which could be redeemed in
the United States for five cents each or $3.30, a return of more than 200%."
Ponzi established a corporation, the Securities Exchange Company, on De-
cember 13, 1919, with the purpose of doubling investors' money through
speculation in postal coupons.W He began recruiting investors by promis-
ing them a fifty-percent return on their money within ninety days. In fact,
initial investors would receive their profits in forty-five days.'"6
However, his legitimate scheme immediately turned into the Peter-
Paul scheme for which it is remembered. First, Ponzi had pressing debts to
repay that required him to use his new capital.16  Ponzi may have rationa-
lized to himself that he would pay off his debts first, and then proceed to use
later capital infusions to arbitrage in postal coupons. Surely, with a 230%
guaranteed return, he had some time to spare. However, Ponzi never got
around to purchasing any coupons, except the dollar's worth he had an Ital-
ian acquaintance buy and send to him to ensure the plan could work.'16
Even if Ponzi had figured out the logistics of sending money abroad to
finance the purchase of the coupons, the plan would not have worked on a
scale of any size. In the United States, International Reply Coupons were
generally redeemed for postage, not for cash. Moreover, no post office
would have redeemed the number of coupons (at five cents each) necessary
to repay a hundred-dollar note, much less thousands of them. In fact, Pon-
162. International Reply Coupons were issued and honored by countries that were
members of the Universal Postal Union, formed in 1874. See Universal Postal Union, UPU
at a Glance, http://www.upu.int/about us/en/upu at a glance.html (last visited May 24,
2010). The Universal Postal Union still exists today, guaranteeing orderly international
postal delivery among member countries. See id.
163. The 1906 Treaty of Rome created the prepayment coupon, to be used by mem-
ber countries, a vast improvement on foreign postal practices. See Many Postal Reforms in
the Treaty ofRome, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1906, at 20 ('"The importance of this provision ...
cannot be overestimated."') (quoting Mr. E. Rosewater, delegate).
164. See ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 95.
165. See id. at 106-07.
166. Id. at 107.
167. See id. at 114-15.
168. See id. at 114 ("[B]usiness would grow slowly and steadily, Ponzi thought,
giving him plenty of time to test, refine, and perfect his cash-for-coupons transfers.").
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zi's scheme would have required more coupons than were ever in circula-
tion by an order of magnitude."
Like Madoff, Ponzi began his fraud by recruiting people he knew,
many of them also Italian immigrants or Italian-Americans in his Boston
neighborhood in January 1920.' In fact, many Ponzi schemes can be de-
scribed as affinity frauds, because community ties and the victim's familiar-
ity with other investors decrease skepticism of the otherwise too-good-to-
be-true promises of financial reward.'7 However, as Ponzi's reputation for
giving large returns grew, so did his clientele. By the summer of 1920,
prospective investors were lined up each morning before the office of the
Security Exchange Company opened. Business was so brisk that Ponzi
opened twelve additional offices throughout Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire, two in Vermont, three in Connecticut, two in Maine, three in Rhode
Island, and two in New Jersey.'72 In fact, Ponzi's operations probably em-
ployed more persons than Madoff's seventeenth-floor operations did.
Unlike Madoff's decades-long swindle, Ponzi's success was short-
lived. Perhaps a swift decline was inevitable given the short duration of the
notes he issued, but Ponzi's scheme technically did not collapse because he
could not honor the repayment of his 50% notes. The sheer popularity of
his enterprise, and the fact that many investors re-invested both principal
and profits with Ponzi, would have kept the scheme going much longer had
he not attracted the attention of both regulators and the press. Yet even
when the Boston Press compensated Ponzi's public relations employee to
go public with his suspicions that the enterprise was a Peter-Paul scheme,
Ponzi was able to fund all investor redemptions that announcement generat-
ed.' Although he may well have evaded the Boston district attorney's of-
169. See id. at 116 (noting that Ponzi would have needed 53,000 coupons to satisfy
just the first eighteen investors, "enough to fill a steamer trunk").
170. See id. at 219-20 ("'If there is anybody in this country requiring protection at the
present time it is the humble Italian immigrant' .. . . 'These poor people from Italy, who are
children in finance, come to this country, and many of them take out citizenship papers.
They can then be put into the trenches and made to give up their lives in defence of this
country. Are we to do nothing to protect their savings and their hard-earned dollars?' (quot-
ing Clarence Barron, the financial news magnate)). See also United States v. Grosky, No. 09
C 4155, 06 CR 359-1, 2009 WL 3064926, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2009) (alluding to the
nature of a Ponzi Scheme, but remarking "or given the original nature of Charles Ponzi's
activities, robbing Pietro to pay Paolo").
171. See Sontag, supra note 63, at BI ("'But because he was Indian-it influenced
me. It made me not think about things I'd usually think of, given my profession."' (quoting a
business school professor who was a victim of Deepak Gulati, a con artist who targeted
immigrants from India)).
172. See ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 124.
173. During the time that Ponzi was being investigated, Ponzi voluntarily stopped
taking investments on July 26, 1920, and offered to redeem any unmatured Ponzi notes for
100% of the principal. During the bankruptcy case that followed the demise of Ponzi's
scheme, these funds would be "clawed back" as preferences, though note holders argued that
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fice," 4 the postmaster general, and the Massachusetts attorney general's
office for the time being, he didn't anticipate being exposed by the state
bank commissioner, who had investigatory powers due to the fact that Ponzi
was a controlling shareholder in Hanover Trust Company, a bank in Bos-
ton."' Once the commissioner, Joseph Allen, could look behind the ac-
counts at Hanover Trust, he could see the footprints of Ponzi's Peter-Paul
scheme and froze all accounts."' Probably not coincidentally, three Ponzi
investors with a combined investment of less than $750 filed an involuntary
petition in court minutes later to declare Ponzi bankrupt. Though Ponzi
could have easily satisfied those small claims, he was frozen, helpless, and
caught.
Many comparisons can be made between Ponzi and Madoff. Each
perpetrated a scheme of a size and scope that was unheard of in his time.
Ponzi's scheme generated millions of dollars in a very short period of
time,"' but admittedly, his stranded investments, even in 2008 dollars,
would only be in the hundreds of millions, certainly not the tens of billions
owed by BLMIS. However, Ponzi's scheme ran from January 1920 to the
beginning of August 1920, a matter of months, not decades."' Moreover,
Ponzi's victims were greater in number than Madoff's victims,"' though the
average investment was more modest. Ponzi's millions also made him one
they were rescinding these contracts because of fraud and therefore not receiving a prefe-
rence. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 10 (1924) (holding that the 500 note holders that
were repaid after July 26 were not rescinding their contracts but were being voluntarily re-
deemed and that by August 2, those note holders had reason to believe that a fraud had oc-
curred).
174. See ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 221-22 (noting that the local prosecutor ended
his investigation while the state investigation was ongoing, telling the press that "the busi-
ness seemed to have been conducted 'normally' and remarked that Ponzi seemed generous to
charity").
175. See Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 8-9 (describing Ponzi's movement of money from
other regional banks to the Hanover Trust Company).
176. As Ponzi was desperately trying to move money from other banks to Hanover
Trust so that regulators would see that his available funds exceeded claims, he miscalculated
the size of another account and bounced a check for $331,000. See id. at 9. He did not have
time to write a smaller check before the bank commissioner pronounced him insolvent. See
ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 259-60.
177. See Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 8 (calculating that "[w]ithin eight months he took
in $9,582,000, for which he issued his notes for $14,374,000"). See also In re Indep. Clear-
ing House Co., 41 B.R. 985, 994-95 n.12 (D. Utah 1984) (calculating that at the time the
involuntary petition was filed against Ponzi on August 9, 1920, his "outstanding liabilities
were $6,948,267.88, and his total assets were $2,195,685.56").
178. At the height of the popularity of his scheme, Ponzi was accepting $1 million
worth of deposits per week, surely challenging the success of BLMIS in 2008 dollars. See
Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 8.
179. ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 298 (noting that 20,000 investors held unmatured
Ponzi notes at the time of his arrest). BLMIS, on the other hand, had 4,900 client accounts at
the time that the fraud was discovered. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 3.
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of the richest men in Boston, living a life of luxury, making large charitable
donations, and owning the most expensive car made at the time. Just as
Madoff's extravagant lifestyle was fueled by the principal of his investors,
so too was Ponzi's climb from obscurity to enormous wealth.
Given Madoff's 150-year sentence, the law treated Ponzi quite gently.
Ponzi pleaded guilty to one count of federal mail fraud,' at the urging of
his wife, and was sentenced to five years in federal prison.'"' Had he gone
to trial, he would have faced a maximum of twenty years under the law of
1920, not the 150 years under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'82
While serving his federal sentence, he also had to defend himself
against state law charges brought by the Massachusetts attorney general,'83
who no doubt felt some embarrassment at not having been the one to get to
Ponzi first.'84 Ponzi represented himself and won an acquittal;' however,
180. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 280 F. 1022, 1022 (1st Cir. 1922) ("[On] October 1,
1920, two indictments charging violation of section 215 of the Penal Code were returned
against said Ponzi in the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.
November 30, 1920, he was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the first count of one of these
indictments, and was sentenced by said court to imprisonment for five years in the House of
Correction at Plymouth .... .").
181. Note that Ponzi's crimes predated both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, so his central crime was one of state law fraud, though use of the
mails made his a federal crime as well.
182. Many of the arguments that the prosecution made in the Madoff case seem not to
apply to Ponzi: Madoff's scheme was terrible because it was long-running, because he fa-
vored friends and employees over other clients, because it was not born out of economic
hardship, because Madoff had "every opportunity to succeed in life through legitimate
work," and because Madoff was not forthcoming in disclosing all of his assets. Govern-
ment's Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Madoff, No. 09 Cr. 213 (June 26, 2009),
available at 2009 WL 1899501. However, under the Guidelines, a modern prosecutor may
have been able to calculate a lengthy sentence for Ponzi as well. Ponzi was charged with two
counts of mail fraud, which would earn him a 40-year sentence. In addition, Ponzi's sen-
tence would have been subject to several enhancements, including affecting more than 250
victims, endangering the financial security of 100 or more individuals, and jeopardizing the
safety and soundness of a financial institution, Hanover Trust.
183. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922) (answering certified question in the
affirmative as to whether the U.S. Attorney General must execute a writ of habeas corpus
filed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to have Charles Ponzi appear at state trial
against him). Though state authorities have left Madoff's prosecution to federal authorities,
state regulators have focused on Madoffs feeder funds. See, e.g., Consent Order at 66-67, In
re Fairfield Greenwhich Advisors LLC, No. 2009-0028 (Mass. Sept. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctfairfield/fairfield-consent.pdf (ordering restitution and a
$500,000 fine from feeder fund).
184. Ponzi, realizing that his scheme was over, chose to surrender to U.S. Attorney
Dan Gallagher on August 12, 1920 on an agreed charge of federal mail fraud, although his
minimal use of the mails was possibly not fraudulent. See ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 287.
However, Ponzi chose to give the honors to the more sympathetic Gallagher than the Massa-
chusetts attorney general, who actually was able to bring an indictment before the federal
prosecutor did. See Fessenden, 258 U.S. at 255 (noting that the Commonwealth of Massa-
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two years later, the Commonwealth retried him on several counts they did
not bring the first time.'" The second trial resulted in a hung jury, but the
third trial brought Ponzi a sentence of seven to nine years.'8 7  The fact that
two out of three juries acquitted Ponzi seems to suggest that he was not vili-
fied by the Massachusetts public.
Public opinion may have also been kinder to Ponzi than to Madoff. A
New York Times editorial very evenhandedly described him as "'something
picturesque, something suggestive of the gallant about him, and it is almost
possible, though not quite, to believe that he was as credulous as his victims
and deceived himself as much as he did them.""" In addition, the editorial
pointed out that his scheme was fueled by his victims: "'Perhaps the disin-
clination for being harsh in characterizing Ponzi is due to lack of any sym-
pathy for those whom he robbed.... They showed only greed-the eager-
ness to get much for nothing-and they had not one of Ponzi's redeeming
graces."" 89 Though some investors were understandably outraged, some
even blamed themselves for being attracted to one of many get-rich-quick
schemes of the day. The bankruptcy proceeding in Ponzi's case was similar
to Madoff' s bankruptcy, and the trustee moved to claw back some inves-
chusetts returned twenty-two indictments against Ponzi on September 11, 1920, followed by
two federal indictments on October 1).
185. See Commonwealth v. Ponzi, 152 N.E. 307, 308 (Mass. 1926) (reciting as back-
ground that "[alt the trial of the 12 [out of 22] indictments, the jury returned verdicts of not
guilty on December 1, 1922").
186. See id. at 308 (reciting as background that the 1924 trial on five of the indict-
ments resulted in an acquittal on one of the counts and hung jury on the remaining four).
187. See id. at 308-09 (noting that Ponzi was sentenced on only one of the four
counts, resulting in a finding that he was "a common and notorious thief' and "sentenced to
not less than seven nor more than nine years in state prison"). Though Ponzi appealed, none
of his issues on appeal were sustained and his conviction was upheld. See id. (overruling
both evidentiary objections and double jeopardy objections based on the fact that the federal
charges of mail fraud were distinct from state law charges of larceny, conspiracy to commit
larceny, and being an accessory before the fact to larceny). Following his release from state
prison, Ponzi was deported to Italy. See Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736, 737 (D. Mass. 1934)
(dismissing all objections to Ponzi's being deported under the Immigration Act of 1917 for
being "sentenced more than once to imprisonment for a term of one year or more, because of
conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude").
188. ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 293-94.
189. Id. at 294.
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tors' gains.'" However, some investors voluntarily gave back their returns
once they realized they were ill-gotten gains.'9'
The general public may have had other crimes with which to compare
Ponzi's crimes as subsequent news stories made Ponzi's scheme not seem
as rare and bizarre as Madoff's. Not only did Hanover Trust fail, but sever-
al other Boston banks failed shortly thereafter, due to the misdeeds of their
own bank officers. Moreover, another Peter-Paul scheme with offices
down the hall from the Securities Exchange Corporation, the Old Colony
Foreign Exchange, failed shortly thereafter when its investors realized that it
was a Ponzi copycat. 92 More broadly, the papers of the day were filled with
other salacious stories, including the Massachusetts trial of Ferdinando Ni-
cola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, and the discovery that eight mem-
bers of the Chicago "Black Sox" baseball team had thrown the 1919 World
Series.1
Almost a century later, Ponzi's name is used as shorthand to character-
ize all Peter-Paul schemes, though these schemes are generally small in size
and scope. To even use the term to describe Madoff's scheme seems quite
strange; BLMIS, a global investment fund with flashy investors and a re-
vered Wall Street wizard as a manager, seems to be a different species than
garden-variety Ponzi schemes. However, history has forgotten that Ponzi's
own scheme was no garden-variety clandestine Peter-Paul scheme. It was a
grand illusion conducted openly in all corners of Boston by a man who
loved to talk to reporters and gained the support of police and bankers alike.
If Madoff was an avuncular figure whose investments were safer than U.S.
treasury bills to his clients, then Ponzi was a hero to his. Ponzi's fall from
190. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 11 (1924) (holding that investors
that accepted Ponzi's offer to redeem their principal before maturity were subject to prefe-
rence rules regarding clawbacks). See also ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 298 (explaining that
for ten years the bankruptcy trustees sent small December payments to victims, refunding
37.5% of money invested to 20,000 people).
191. See ZUCKOFF, supra note 160, at 298 (noting that "a handful of Ponzi winners-
those who'd collected their 50 percent interest before the collapse-turned over the money
voluntarily").
192. See Gallagher v. Hannigan, 5 F.2d 171, 173 (1st Cir. 1925) (relating the facts of
the bankrupt Old Colony Foreign Exchange Company, which had issued notes promising to
pay fifty percent interest in ninety days beginning on July 23, 1920 and ending on August 13,
after investors "started a run on" Old Colony after Ponzi's scheme was disclosed the day
before). Two of the shareholders of Old Colony were arrested August 13, 1920, and the third
left the country. See id.
193. See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839, 843, 845 (Mass. 1926) (describing
the armed robbery of Slater & Morrill, Inc. and the shooting of two employees on April 15,
1920, and the 1921 trial).
194. See generally James R. Devine, Baseball's Labor Wars in Historical Context:
The 1919 Chicago White Sox as a Case-Study in Owner-Player Relations, 5 MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 1 (1994).
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grace was as dramatic as Madoffs, but history may not treat Madoff as be-
nignly as it has treated Ponzi.
IV. CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS AS REFLECTIONS OF SOCIETY'S FEAR AND
OUTRAGE
Generally, the criminalization of an action, and the sentence that ac-
companies that action, reflects society's placement of a value on the liberty
interest that is being violated by that action. If a society makes it a crime to
physically assault another or to take another's life, then such laws reflect an
individual's interest in bodily safety and an interest in being free from fear
of bodily harm. From time to time, a particular society may choose to cri-
minalize an act because of beliefs in the moral, not physical, harm of that
act, such as adultery. Other laws may target acts that offend a society's
moral sense but may also be framed as targeting acts that cause direct or
indirect physical harm, such as prostitution. Over time, laws in a given so-
ciety may change as groups of citizens persuade lawmakers that previous
laws are obsolete or misguided. Whereas in one era the interest in not being
cuckolded was exceptionally strong, not only for moral reasons but also for
reasons of certainty in property distribution, this interest may not seem as
strong in a different era. Therefore, state laws surrounding adultery may
either be repealed. or not prosecuted."' In addition, citizens may persuade
lawmakers to criminalize acts that have become a problem, either as beha-
viors change or technology enables new behaviors to be possible. For ex-
ample, a state may create criminal prohibitions against certain types of ac-
tivities that inflict emotional distress, such as stalking.'9
Just as legal prohibitions of certain actions reflect society's values, the
sentences given to criminals who violate these laws should reflect the priori-
ty given on the interests protected by the laws. Most states have a multitude
of laws designed to ensure safe and orderly driving, and the violations of
these laws carry varying punishments, from fines to jail sentences. These
195. See Gabrielle Viator, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Law-
rence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 837, 840-41 (2006) (discussing the rationale behind
common law adultery prohibitions). For example, the District of Columbia abolished the
criminal offense of adultery in 2004. See id at 842.
196. Non-prosecution norms can lead to opportunities for selective prosecution by
sending a message that the activity is not truly prohibited, but allowing law enforcement to
retain the right to prosecute common acts. See, e.g., Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount:
Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY
L.J. 691, 694 (2006) (outlining how "prosecutorial discretion works to control the reach of
controversial criminal laws").
197. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(2) (Vernon 2003) (establishing the
crime of stalking in which a defendant knows or reasonably believes that a course of conduct
would, and reasonably does, put another in fear of bodily injury or death to herself or a
household member or damage to property).
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disparate punishments reflect the degree of seriousness with which the state
views the acts, from jaywalking, to speeding, to driving under the influence
of drugs or alcohol.
Unfortunately, as a society evolves and new crimes are continually
added and few repealed, the end result may not seem consistent with mod-
em values. Some laws currently in force may seem silly to modem citizens
and may in reality not be prosecuted, or unfortunately, selectively prosecut-
ed. In addition, the resulting array of punishments may not seem cohesive
when certain crimes are compared to others. Even before the Madoff vic-
tims began telling their stories, other narratives were at work in enhancing
the penalties for nonviolent thefts, in contrast to historical punishments for
various categories of thievery.
A. Theft
1. Common Law Theft
Historically, society has had an interest in protecting the property
rights of others, both in real and personal property. Theft laws reflect a
society's valuation of ownership interests in personal property. At common
law, the three main thefts were larceny, embezzlement, and false pre-
tenses.'" Though most state laws have collapsed these distinctions into one
general theft statute,'" at common law they were distinguishable and treated
unequally. Larceny was defined as the wrongful taking of property from the
victim's possession.200 Larceny by trick expanded larceny to include situa-
tions in which the thief tricked the possessor into granting the thief posses-
sion, and then the thief effectively took title to the property.20 ' Embezzle-
ment applied to more complicated situations in which the thief was volunta-
rily given possession without any trick or evil intent, but then the thief
wrongfully took title.202 The crime of false pretenses covered situations
where the thief was voluntarily given both possession and title to another's
property, but under false pretenses.203
Larceny is the only adverse dispossession of these common law thefts,
and was distinguishable because larceny threatened not only the bodily in-
tegrity of the possessor, but also the public peace. The society as a whole
198. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 19.1 (4th ed. 2003) (chronicling the
development of larceny in England and the subsequent creation of the crimes of embezzle-
ment and false pretences for types of theft that fell outside the parameters of larceny).
199. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
200. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. ScoTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
622 (1972).
201. See LAFAVE, supra note 198, at § 19.1(b).
202. See id.
203. See id.
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has an interest in having its public places free of both the violence of thie-
very and the violence of self-help remedies for thievery. As the crimes of
embezzlement and false pretenses developed, however, courts took an inter-
est in losses of property interest that were effectively peaceful but still
created a need for deterrence and retribution.2 04
2. Robbery
Moreover, as crimes became codified, different types of thievery were
also categorized based on interests other than personal property interests.
For example, robbery occurs when possession is taken from the actual per-
son of another, and it carries a higher penalty than some other types of
theft.205 This additional penalty reflects not the mere value of the owner's
interest in the property, but also the value of the owner's interest in her bo-
dily integrity.206 During a forcible taking of property from one's person, the
owner or possessor may be put in reasonable fear for her person. This inter-
est in bodily integrity is an interest that society has historically held very
dear, which explains why the United States has held its harshest punish-
ments in reserve for actions that result in death or bodily injury.
In addition, unlike most larceny statutes, robbery statutes do not assign
punishment based on the value of the property stolen. Rather, robbery sta-
tutes distinguish between the intensity of the fear that the victim may rea-
sonably experience, based on whether the thief used a weapon or gave the
impression that the thief had a weapon to use. Therefore, a robber faces the
same penalty for stealing a wallet full of money or an empty wallet, but
faces a harsher penalty if armed.207 Again, the increased penalty reflects the
increased value that society places on being free from fear of imminent se-
vere physical harm.
3. Burglary
Just as having property taken off of one's person entails a different
kind of risk of harm as property taken that was not in one's possession,
property taken from one's home constitutes a separate violation. Burglary,
the taking of a property from a residence, also carries a penalty greater than
204. See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REv. 469,
472-73 (1976).
205. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006).
The crime of robbery under the Texas statute is a second-degree felony. Id. § 29.02(b).
206. See LAFAVE, supra note 198, at § 20.3 (describing robbery as an offense against
a person and a substantial departure from societal norms).
207. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006).
Under the Texas statute, aggravated robbery is a felony in the first degree. See id.
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simple theft.208 Here, the crime reflects society's interest in both the sanctity
of the home and the safety of one's self and family in one's home." At
common law, the elements of burglary also required that the taking occur
after nightfall, possibly reflecting a concern that residents are more likely,
though not necessarily, to be at home, and possibly asleep and vulnerable,
after nightfall.210
B. Securities Fraud and Investment Fraud
If laws reflect the values of the society that enacts them, then criminal
law in the United States tends to reflect a historical value on citizens' own-
ership interest in personal property; however, enhanced penalties for similar
crimes that endanger life and limb seem to indicate an even greater value on
bodily safety. In fact, the ultimate crime has been the taking of life, and the
law reserves the harshest penalty, execution, for only certain categories of
killings. However, recent changes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
recent sentences under those Guidelines seem to reflect a growing concern
for financial safety, possibly over bodily safety. As the Madoff victim im-
pact statements report, loss of financial safety can be a fate worse than
death.211
V. FINANCIAL FRAUDSTERS AS THE NEW EVIL
Following the accounting scandals of 2001 and beyond, various corpo-
rate officers were prosecuted and convicted of fraud, often receiving lengthy
sentences. Lawmakers and regulators spoke of restoring investor confi-
dence in the markets so that investors felt sufficiently safe to invest their
savings in U.S. securities. No longer were public officials worried about
citizens feeling secure in their homes or even in actual physical marketplac-
es from bodily harm or fear of property theft; the larger concern was that
208. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006).
Under the Texas statute, the burglary of a habitation is a second-degree felony, but the bur-
glary of a non-residential building is a state jail felony. Id. § 30.02(c).
209. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223 ("[T]he law of England has
so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it styles it his castle,
and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity .... ).
210. Note that the residence need not be occupied at the time of the intrusion for the
theft to be classified as burglary. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
211. See Victim Impact Statements, supra note 81, at 71, Email from Jackie Stone to
Judge Chin (June 10, 2009) ("It was the beginning of a new kind of death-our family, includ-
ing my dad, mom, brother, aunt, uncle, cousins-were ALL dead-in one shot. Bernie had
killed our family, life, emotions, survival, resource for food, shelter, medicine and our belief
in other humans. He DESTROYED our lives in one second!!!!!").
984 [Vol. 2009:947
Evil Has a New Name
citizens felt secure in their savings.212 If this confidence were not restored,
then U.S. capital might shift to foreign investment or to less efficient uses.
Just as larceny was a threat to the public peace, corporate fraud was seen as
a threat to peaceful and efficient markets, which were essential to the U.S.
economy.
In addition, corporate fraudsters incited the ire of the general public,
and names like Bernard Ebbers and Jeffrey Skilling took the places of Jeff-
rey Dahmer and Ted Bundy as shorthand references to evil. Though prose-
cutors did not produce proof that Ebbers knew of accounting fraud at MCI
WorldCom, Inc., in March 2005 the chief executive officer was found guilty
of securities fraud under the theory of "willful blindness" and sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison.213 Jeffrey Skilling, former President and CEO
of Enron Corp., was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison on charges of
conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, multiple counts of securities
fraud, false statements to auditors, and insider trading. Skilling faces a
maximum prison term of 185 years if he is ultimately resentenced.214
Charles Ponzi faced the wrath of both federal and state authorities, who
even sought to jail him twice for the same crime, and served what seemed
like a lengthy sentence-four of a five-year federal sentence and seven of a
nine-year state sentence. However, his completely illegitimate fraudulent
investment scheme earned him just a fraction of the jail time that federal
judges have meted out to Ebbers, Skilling, and other convicted corporate
officers.2 15
212. Since the crash of 1929, regulators have stressed investor confidence. Ferdinand
Pecora pontificated in 1934: "If the system of private property is to be a reality for all the
people who save money as a protection against sickness and old age, there must be a discon-
tinuance of past practices by which a few men have been able, for their own aggrandizement,
to destroy the savings of hundreds of thousands-even millions-of our people." See
ARVEDLUND, supra note 8, at 208.
213. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 130 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding sentence
on appeal).
214. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 591 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding convic-
tion, but rejecting Guidelines enhancement for jeopardizing solvency of a financial institu-
tion, thereby vacating Skilling's sentence). Skilling has not yet been resentenced because his
appeal of the Fifth Circuit's opinion regarding conviction was granted certiorari in the Su-
preme Court of the United States. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 393 (2009). Oral
argument is set for March 1, 2010. See Supreme Court of the United States, available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/daycall/daycall_03-01-10.pdf (last visited
May 25, 2010).
215. Ken Lay, former CEO and Chairman of the Board of Enron, faced up to 165
years in prison, but died of a heart attack prior to sentencing. See United States v. Lay, 456
F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that under existing law, Lay's conviction
would be vacated due to his death prior to entry of judgment pending appeal). John and
Timothy Rigas, controlling shareholders and corporate officers of Adelphia Communications
Corporation, were sentenced to twelve and seventeen years in federal prison, respectively,
from securities fraud violations. See United States v. Rigas, 584 F.3d 594, 601, 616 (3d Cir.
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Between 1920 and 2009, several events have shaped corporate crimi-
nal law in the United States. Following the stock market crash of 1929, and
the congressional investigations and hearings that followed, Congress built
the foundation for the current securities law regime, enacting both the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and creating
the Securities Exchange Commission. Following the accounting scandals of
2001, Congress again addressed corporate officer behavior by enacting the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,216 which among other things, required the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be amended to impose harsher penalties
on those who commit corporate wrongs.217 Responding to public outrage
over companies like Enron-whose stock price plummeted after revelations
of corporate misdeeds and false disclosure, leaving employees and retirees
with worthless 401(k) plans once bulging with company stock-the Guide-
lines were amended to reflect the importance of financial stability in large
corporations, employee retirement plans, and financial institutions.2 18 In
upholding Ebbers' sentence, the Second Circuit acknowledged that: "Twen-
ty-five years is a long sentence for a white collar crime, longer than the sen-
tences routinely imposed by many states for violent crimes, including mur-
der, or other serious crimes such as serial child molestation" and admitted
that under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "all but the most trivial frauds
in publicly traded companies may trigger sentences amounting to life impri-
sonment."2 19
However, the court defended the "harsh, but not unreasonable" sen-
tence by stating that "the Guidelines reflect Congress' judgment as to the
appropriate national policy for such crimes."220 Judge Chin also defended
the 150-year sentence he fashioned for Bernie Madoff:
2009) (allowing prosecution in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to resume on some
counts, even though defendants had already been convicted and sentenced in the Southern
District of New York for similar crimes). Jamie Olis, a young, mid-level executive, became
the poster child for excessive sentences when he was sentenced to twenty-four years for his
alleged participation in accounting fraud at Dynegy, Inc.; on remand from the Fifth Circuit,
his sentence was reduced to six years. United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL
2716048, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
216. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
217. Pursuant to sections 805, 905, and 1104, Congress requested the Commission to
"promulgate the guidelines or amendments provided ... as soon as practicable, and in any
event not later than 180 days after [enactment]." Id. §§ 805(b), 905(c), 1104(c).
218. The Guidelines now provide for increases in penalties if the offense involves
250 victims, further increases if the offense substantially endangers the solvency or financial
security of 100 or more individual victims, and further increases if the offense jeopardizes
employee retirement plans. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(13)(B)
(2007).
219. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006).
220. Id. at 129-30.
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Here, the message must be sent that Mr. Madoff's crimes were extraordinarily evil,
and that this kind of irresponsible manipulation of the system is not merely a
bloodless financial crime that takes place just on paper, but that it is instead, as we
have heard, one that takes a staggering human toll.22'
The prosecution, in preparing its Sentencing Memorandum that pro-
posed a sentence of 150 years, calculated this amount according to post-
2002 Guideline enhancements for losses of more than $400 million, harm to
more than 250 victims, and harm that endangered the financial security of
100 or more individuals.222
CONCLUSION
Though historically one's home has been one's castle and worthy of
heightened protection from the law, the past decades of relative peace in the
United States have mitigated our concerns of home invasion and other types
of criminal physical harm. However, one's savings and retirement accounts
have become the new castles that must be protected by the government from
criminal fraudsters. As daily survival has become expected and our life
expectancy extended, our fears have shifted to survival of our retirement
funds. Narratives of those who have lost their nest-eggs, whether Enron
employees or Madoff victims, resonate with the populace and with legisla-
tors. Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines reflect these new
fears, and corporate officers like Ebbers and Skilling, and fraudsters like
Madoff, feel the wrath of those harmed in their lengthy sentences. Rightly
or wrongly, the Madoff victims equate their financial ordeal with the most
violent atrocities in human history. Perhaps Judge Chin's wish that Ma-
doff's lengthy sentence have symbolic meaning is fulfilled; however, the
sentence may symbolize the greed of the victims as well as the greed of the
fraudster.
221. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 47.
222. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 16-17.
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